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We present a method for algorithmic, compositional veriﬁcation of control-ﬂow-based
safety properties of sequential programs with procedures. The application of the method
involves three steps: (1) decomposing the desired global property into local properties
of the components, (2) proving the correctness of the property decomposition by using
a maximal model construction, and (3) verifying that the component implementations
obey their local speciﬁcations. We consider safety properties of both the structure and
the behaviour of program control ﬂow. Our compositional veriﬁcation method builds on
a technique proposed by Grumberg and Long that uses maximal models to reduce com-
positional veriﬁcation of ﬁnite-state parallel processes to standard model checking. We
present a novel maximal model construction for the fragment of the modal -calculus
with boxes and greatest ﬁxed points only, and adapt it to control-ﬂow graphs modelling
components described in a sequential procedural language. We extend our veriﬁcation
method to programs with private procedures by deﬁning an abstraction, presented as an
inlining transformation. All algorithms have been implemented in a tool set automating all
required veriﬁcation steps. We validate our approach on an electronic purse case study.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Motivation. Over the last years, computer systems have become increasingly dynamic: they are composed of various com-
municating components that can join the system or be put together dynamically. Typical examples aremobile smart devices
(mobile phones, smart cards, television set top boxes, PDAs, etc.) and dynamically reconﬁguring distributed systems. When
allowing the dynamic addition of new components, one wishes to ensure that this will not have any negative impact on the
global behaviour of the system. In particular when the system contains privacy-sensitive information, as is for example the
case for smart cards containing health care information or electronic purses, strong security guarantees are required. With
the acceptance of evaluation schemes such as Common Criteria (see [1]), industry has come to realise that theway to achieve
such high guarantees is to adopt the use of formal methods in industrial practice.
The techniques developed here are applicable in any context concerned with interprocedural control-ﬂow properties of
components communicating via procedure calls. Interesting properties of such components include for example type safety,
memory consumption, and illicit data or control ﬂow. Herewe concentrate on the last category of properties. More precisely,
we study sequential (i.e., single-threaded) programs andpropose a speciﬁcation and veriﬁcationmethod for safety properties
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of inter-procedural control ﬂow, i.e., properties describing safe sequences of procedure invocations. Typical examples of
control-ﬂow safety properties are: “m1 never callsm2”, “m1 is never called whenm2 is called”, “m1 is only called afterm2 is
called”, and “m1 is only called from withinm2” (see Chugunov et al. [2] for a formalisation).
So far, most research on formal veriﬁcation in this area has focused on the correctness or security of a single program
component (e.g., [3,4,5]). However, in the context of mobile code we also need techniques to support veriﬁcation of systems
for which it is not known in advance what its components will be. In such situations one needs compositional veriﬁcation
techniques, that is techniques where one states minimal requirements for the components that can become available later,
and then veriﬁes (at loading time) that the components actually respect these requirements. Only then, existing components
can safely communicate with new components, without corrupting the correctness or security of the whole system. In
particular, such techniques can support the secure post-issuance loading of new applications onto smart devices. To avoid
false negatives, i.e., rejecting components that are actually secure, such compositional veriﬁcation techniques should not
only be sound, but also complete. Completeness is also crucial to avoid typical social engineering attacks, where the device
user gets so frustrated with the system repeatedly rejecting new components, that he/she will simply accept all, without
actually inspecting whether they passed veriﬁcation or not.
Approach. Our veriﬁcation method is compositional: it allows global guarantees of a system to be veriﬁed even if the
implementations of some components are not yet available at veriﬁcation time. This is achieved by abstracting the missing
components by logical assumptions. These assumptions can be veriﬁed later, when the implementations become available.
Such a veriﬁcation approach is embodied by the following proof principle:
 A : φ X : φ  X ⊗ B : ψ
 A⊗ B : ψ
where A and B are components, and X is a component variable. This principle reduces the problem of showing that the
composition of components A and B satisﬁes ψ , where the implementation of A is not yet known, to three tasks:
(1) decompose the global property ψ by ﬁnding a suitable local property φ of component A,
(2) prove correctness of the decomposition, i.e., verify that for any component X satisfying φ, X composed with B satisﬁes ψ
(second premise), and
(3) when the implementation of A becomes available, verify that it satisﬁes the local property φ (ﬁrst premise).
Notice that this rule can be applied repeatedly, to replace several components by assumptions.
The compositionality of the method supports different scenarios for secure conﬁguration of components on a device (or
platform), where the tasks above can potentially be delegated to different authorities. In one such scenario, the device issuer
(or platform provider) speciﬁes both the global guarantee (e.g., a security policy) and the local assumptions, and veriﬁes—
using the techniques described in this paper—that the decomposition is correct, meaning that the local speciﬁcation is
sufﬁcient to establish the global speciﬁcation. Each time a new component is to be added (i.e., loaded on the device), an
algorithm provided by the device issuer checks whether the component implementation satisﬁes the required speciﬁcation.
An alternative scenario is that the device issuer only provides the global guarantee (and local assumptions for its own
components), and leaves it to the component provider to comeupwith an appropriate local speciﬁcation for each component
to be added. As in the previous scenario, an algorithm provided by the device issuer checks the component against the
local speciﬁcation upon loading, but now also the property decomposition needs to be veriﬁed at loading time, potentially
on-device.
Task (1) above is amanual one and requires insight into the system,while the other two can be automated in our approach.
We show how Tasks (2) and (3) can be algorithmically reduced to problems for which standard algorithmic techniques exist.
The approach that we take to handle Task (2) is inspired by the pioneering work on automatic modular veriﬁcation by
Grumberg and Long [6]. To check whether X : φ |= X ⊗ B : ψ holds we replace X by a maximal model θ(φ) and then verify
|= θ(φ) ⊗ B : ψ algorithmically. The maximal model θ(φ) represents all models satisfying φ in the sense that it simulates
exactly those models and thus satisﬁes precisely the properties enjoyed by all these models. For this technique to be sound
and applicable it is required that maximal models exist for the chosen logic and simulation relation,⊗ preserves simulation,
and logical properties are preserved by simulation. In earlier work [7], we explored deductive veriﬁcation of correctness of
decompositions based on a proof system. The logic considered there was more expressive, but the interactive nature of the
approach required considerable time and expertise from the user, rendering the approach less preferable in many situations
as compared to algorithmic solutions like the one presented here.
We are interested in safety properties of both the structure and the behaviour of programs. Since the same behaviour can be
brought about by different structures, a behavioural property language allows properties to be expressed in a more abstract
fashion.However, as a rule, behavioural properties require computationallymore expensive veriﬁcation techniques. Still, they
can often be (equivalently) reformulated on the structural level, with the advantage of allowingmore efﬁcient veriﬁcation. To
support both kinds of properties, we distinguish between a structural and a behavioural level of programs. Both structure and
behaviour are cast via the abstract notion ofmodel (or labelled Kripke structure). Then, structural properties are interpreted
over the (ﬁnite-state) control-ﬂow graphs themselves, while behavioural properties are interpreted over the (inﬁnite-state)
behaviours induced by the structures. The logic we employ to express such properties is a modal logic with box modalities
and simultaneous greatest ﬁxed points (written in equational form), which is expressively equivalent to the fragment of the
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modal-calculuswith boxmodalities and greatest ﬁxed points only [8]. The fragment is known to be adequate for expressing
safety properties (cf. [9]). Because of the close relationship between logical satisfaction and simulation betweenmodels, and
the compositional properties of simulation, this logic, which for conveniencewe term simulation logic, is particularly suitable
for compositional veriﬁcation viamaximalmodels.We instantiate simulation logic and simulation at both the structural and
the behavioural levels.
Themethodsprovidedbyanapplet are frequently implementedusing internal, privatemethods. Since theprivatemethods
cannotbeexpected tobeknownbefore theapplet is implemented,we introducepublic interfaces,whichhideprivatemethods.
Accordingly, the (public) interface behaviour of an applet abstracts from (internal) calls to the private methods of an applet.
To handle Task (3) for programswith private procedures, we deﬁne an inlining transformation that recursively inlines all calls
to private procedures. This transformation over-approximates the interface behaviour, and reduces the task to showing that
the inlined program respects property φ. For the latter, we apply standard algorithmic veriﬁcation techniques.
Contributions. The main contribution of the present paper is a sound and complete compositional veriﬁcation principle for
sequential programs with procedures, for properties expressed in simulation logic, and its adaptation to programs with
private procedures. In more detail, the contributions are as follows.
(1) Program model. Most of the existing work on compositional model checking focuses on the veriﬁcation of parallel
compositions of ﬁnite-state processes. We extend compositional model checking to an important class of inﬁnite-state
programs, namely sequential programs with procedures. In the rest of this paper, we refer to programs as applets and to
procedures asmethods, but we would like to stress that our technique is applicable to many different kinds of programs
with procedures.We represent applets as collections ofmethod control-ﬂow graphs equippedwith interfaces of provided
and required methods. Applet composition forms the disjoint union of the respective collections of method graphs and
allows the composed applets to communicate via method invocation. Applets correspond to a subclass of pushdown
processes, with potentially inﬁnite-state behaviour (cf. Burkart et al. [10]).
(2) Maximal model Construction.We establish a logical characterisation of the standard notion of simulation between models
and, vice versa, a behavioural characterisationof logical satisfaction in termsof maximalmodels. In particular,wepresent a
novelmaximalmodel construction, consisting of a step-wise transformation of the formula into a semantically equivalent
normal form,which is isomorphic to amaximalmodel for the formula. In contrast tomore expressive logics, themaximal
models for simulation logic formulae are representable as standard transition systems. To the best of our knowledge, this
is the ﬁrst maximal model construction for (a variant of) the modal -calculus, which includes the full expressive power
of simultaneous greatest ﬁxed points.
(3) Maximal applet construction. When tailoring the maximal model technique to applets, we require that the maximal
model for a given property is itself an applet. This is necessary for completeness of the technique. Since the veriﬁcation of
|= θ(φ) ⊗ B : ψ is decidable in our setup, completeness guarantees that if the veriﬁcation of the correctness of decom-
position fails, there is indeed an applet F among the set of models such that F satisﬁes φ but F ⊗ B does not satisfy ψ .
Completeness is thus essential in that it eliminates the possibility of false negatives. Therefore, in case |= θ(φ) ⊗ B : ψ
fails, we know that we have to strengthen φ and iterate the process.
To adapt the maximal model technique to structural properties, we ﬁrst give a logical characterisation of interfaces by
deﬁning, for a given interface I a structural formula φI which is satisﬁed exactly by those models representing applet
structures with this interface, and then deﬁne the maximal applet for a given interface I and structural property φ by
θI(φ) = θ(φI ∧ φ). Since θ(φI ∧ φ) satisﬁes both φ and φI , this guarantees that the resulting maximal model is indeed an
applet structure with interface I satisfying the structural formula φ.
However, for behavioural properties there is in general no unique maximal applet: different applets, incomparable by
simulation, might exist that satisfy the same property. It is ongoing work to investigate under what conditions and how
this collection of maximal applets can be characterised exactly. Preliminary results in this direction are presented by
Gurov and Huisman in [11].
(4) Compositional veriﬁcation.Our characterisation results, togetherwith results linking the structural and behavioural levels,
give rise to a compositional veriﬁcation principle of the shape suggested above, where the global guarantee can be either
structural or behavioural, but the local assumptions are always structural. We establish the soundness and completeness
of the principle, and adapt existing algorithmic techniques for dealing with the resulting veriﬁcation sub-tasks.
(5) Interface abstraction.We extend our compositional veriﬁcationmethod to interface properties of applets, i.e., properties of
the interface behaviour.We deﬁne an abstractionwhich reduces the set ofmethods of a given applet to the set of its public
methods, while over-approximating the interface behaviour of the applet. This abstraction is based on inlining of private
methods. We show the abstraction to be sound with respect to interface properties: every interface property that holds
for the behaviour of the inlined applet also holds for the interface behaviour of the original applet. Since the abstraction
transformation may introduce new interface behaviours, completeness, on the other hand, does not hold in general.
However, for the case when the concrete implementation is last-call recursive (that is, recursive calls are not followed
in the control-ﬂow graph by any other method calls), the abstraction technique is complete with respect to observable
interface properties: if such a property does not hold of the inlined applet it does not hold of the original applet either.
Last-call recursion is a generalisation of the notion of tail recursion, where recursive calls are the last statements of their
methods. In practice, for industrial code it is very common to be last-call recursive.
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(6) Tool support and real-life case study. To support our compositional veriﬁcation technique, we have developed a tool set.
This tool set integrates our own implementations in Ocaml of themaximal applet construction and the inlining algorithm
with an implementation of a model extractor, build on top of the SOOT framework [12], and a number of external model
checking tools. We have validated this tool set on an industrial case study, namely an electronic purse smart card applet
for which we have veriﬁed the absence of certain illicit control ﬂows between Purse and Loyalty applets. In particu-
lar, we ensured that different Loyalty applets on the card cannot communicate information about the transaction log
table – that is needed to correctly compute the points in the loyalty program – among themselves, instead they all need
to register (and pay) to get this information directly from the Purse. In this case study, the inlining technique proved to
be an essential ingredient that enabled the compositional veriﬁcation of the otherwise too large model.
Our contributions span the complete spectrum from the theoretical underpinnings of the compositional applet veriﬁcation
technique (our principal contribution) to its support by a tool set and its application to an industrial case study.
Related work. The work presented here is related to several different research areas.
Programmodel. The programmodel used in the present paper has been inspired by thework of Besson et al. [4], who verify
stack properties for Java programs. Typically, the behaviour of programs with recursion is modelled as Pushdown Automata
(as, e.g., in [3,13]).
Recursive state machines were introduced by Alur et al. [5] as a formalism capable of modelling the control ﬂow of
sequential imperative programs containing recursive procedure calls. This programmodel is closely related to our own, but
is ﬁner in that calls and returns relate individual entry and return nodes, thus allowing the effect of data to be modelled. The
authors develop efﬁcient algorithms for (global) model checking of recursive statemachines against LTL and CTL* properties,
and investigate their complexity.
Temporal logic. Related to the above program models is the temporal logic of calls and returns CaRet proposed by Alur
et al. [14]. This logic allows to specify properties in terms of method calls and returns, thus increasing the expressiveness of
temporal logic while retaining decidability of model checking. A special veriﬁcation strategy is deﬁned, that is able to “jump
over” internal computations. An extension of this logic was recently presented by Alur et al. [15]. Among other modalities,
it introduces the useful “within” modality, which is not expressible in simulation logic. While these logics may be more
adequate than simulation logic for specifying behavioural properties of programs with procedures, they would (arguably)
require more involved techniques for compositional veriﬁcation.
Compositional veriﬁcation. There is a wealth of methods for compositional veriﬁcation of concurrent programs, most no-
tably assumption/commitment based reasoning about processes with synchronousmessage passing, and the rely/guarantee
method for shared-variable concurrency. A systematic overview of these and related proof methods, some of which have
been adapted to support algorithmic veriﬁcation is given by De Roever et al. [16]. However, these techniques do not address
programs with recursive procedures.
Laster andGrumberg [17] present a compositionalmethod for sequential programswritten in a high-levelWhile language
(without procedures). Their technique partitions the program text into a sequence of sequentially composed subprograms,
which can be model checked individually using assumptions on the properties holding at the cut points.
Alur and Grosu [18] present an assume-guarantee style compositional veriﬁcation principle for a hierarchic extension of
reactive state machines. However, their approach does not address programs with recursion.
Ly [19] also proposes a compositional method for deciding control-ﬂow properties of procedural programs based on
local structural assumptions and global behavioural guarantees. The author generalises our decidability results to monadic
second-order logic for programs whose control-ﬂow graphs have a bounded tree-width. To the best of our knowledge, so far
this approach has not been implemented in a tool.
The method of partial model checking introduced by Andersen [20] is based on a reduction procedure that removes
the top-level operator from a process algebra term and computes a new property for the reduced term. To verify that the
product P × Q of two processes has some property φ, the reduction “divides” the property φ by Q to yield φ/Q , which can be
effectively computed only if Q is ﬁnite.
Maximal models for compositional veriﬁcation. The original maximal model technique by Grumberg and Long [6] was
designed for ACTL, the universal fragment of CTL, and later extended to ACTL*, the universal fragment of CTL*, by Kupferman
and Vardi [21]. These works study synchronous parallel compositions of sequential processes under fairness assumptions.
Sincewe are interested in safety properties of sequential programs, we do not need to add fairness to ourmodels. Simulation
logic and ACTL* are expressively incomparable: liveness properties such as GFp (“inﬁnitely often p”) are expressible in ACTL*,
but not in simulation logic, while the -calculus formula νX. p ∧ [−][−]X (“p holds on every other level of the computation
tree”) is easily translated tosimulation logic (which is inequational form),but isnotexpressible inACTL*.Our transformational
approach to the maximal model construction is closer to an implementation than the automata-theoretic constructions in
the cited papers, since it already includes certain optimisations, e.g., removal of duplicate and unreachable equations.
Characterisation results connecting logics and behavioural preorders similar to ours are described by Boudol and Larsen
[22] (see also [23]), who construct maximal models in the form of modal transition systems with respect to the reﬁnement
preorder for Hennessy–Milner logic (HML) [24]. Simulation logic andHML are expressively incomparable: existential proper-
ties arenot expressible in simulation logic,while co-recursiveproperties (such as invariants) arenot expressible inHML. Since
HML does not include ﬁxed points, the constructed maximal models are essentially ﬁnite forests. Apart from the absence of
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diamond modalities in simulation logic, our construction can be seen as an extension of Larsen and Boudol’s with greatest
ﬁxed points. The extension of HML with greatest ﬁxed points (or, equivalently, simulation logic with diamond modalities)
requires more general models than modal transition systems: a ﬁnite maximal modal transition system does not exist for
all formulae of this logic. This is shown by Dams and Namjoshi [25], who introduce focus transition systems, generalising
modal transition systems, in order to construct linear-size maximal models for properties expressed by alternating tree
automata (thus subsuming the full modal -calculus). In [26] the same authors propose to directly use -automata obtained
from modal -calculus formulae as maximal models, for which they deﬁne an appropriate notion of simulation. All natural
extensions of simulation logic requiremodelswithmore structure than transition systems to capturemaximalmodels. In our
work, we were interested in safety properties, for which simulation logic and transition systems are an appropriate choice.
Bouajjani et al. [9] deﬁne maximal models for a co-recursive modal logic expressing safety properties. Their logic has an
expressivepowersimilar toours, but is somewhat less standardas it includesaconnectivecorresponding tonon-deterministic
choice.
A more recent application of the maximal model technique is presented by Goldman and Katz [27] in the context of
modular veriﬁcation of aspects. While close in spirit to our veriﬁcation principle, the principle presented by the authors is
for a more complicated composition operator. The principle is based on the maximal model of the aspect property (which is
not necessary a legal aspect behaviour) and is therefore sound, but not complete.
Organisation. The paper is structured as follows. First, Section 2 presents the theoretical foundation for our work: it deﬁnes
the models and logic that we consider, together with appropriate notions of simulation and satisfaction. Next, Section 3
presents our novel maximal model construction, and shows how logical satisfaction of a formula is equivalent to simulation
by the corresponding maximal model. Section 4 then discusses how our results instantiate to applets, at structural and at
behavioural level, and Section 5 presents the compositional veriﬁcation principle. Section 6 presents the inlining abstraction
that we use to be able to verify interface properties over applets with private methods. Finally, Sections 7 and 8 illustrate
how our approach is implemented as a tool set and is applied to an industrial case study, while Section 9 draws conclusions
and presents future work.
This paper is a combination and extension of several results presented earlier. The maximal model construction and
compositional veriﬁcation principle are presented in [28]. The abstraction technique for applets with private methods is
presented in [29]. The case study was presented in [30], but without taking the difference between public and private
methods into account.
2. Models, simulation and logic
This section describes the theoretical foundation for our treatment of control-ﬂow structure and behaviour of programs
with recursive procedures. First, we deﬁne the (abstract) models that we study, together with the standard notion of simu-
lation. Further, we deﬁne the logic that we use to express our program properties. Finally, we transfer all these notions to
the so-called weak setting, where not all actions are observable.
2.1. Model and simulation
First we deﬁne models, speciﬁcations and simulation. These notions are standard up to some minor variations.
Deﬁnition 1 (Model, speciﬁcation). A model is a structure M = (S, L,→,A, λ), where S is a set of states, → ⊆ S × L × S is a
labelled transition relation with labels taken from L, and λ : S → P(A) is a valuation assigning to each state a set of atomic
propositions taken from A. A speciﬁcation S is a pair (M, E), whereM is a model and E ⊆ S is a set of entry states.
The reachable part of a speciﬁcation S = (M, E) is deﬁned byR(S) = (M′, E), whereM′ is obtained fromM by deleting
all states and transitions not reachable from any entry state in E.
Example 2. Fig. 1 shows the graphical representation of the speciﬁcation S = (M, E), whereM = ({s1, s2, s3}, {a, ε},→, {p, q},
{s1 → {p, q}, s2 → {p}, s3 →∅}) with → = {(s1, ε, s2), (s2, a, s1), (s2, a, s3), (s3, a, s1), (s3, ε, s2)} and E = {s1, s2}. As usual, entry
states are depicted through additional incoming edges without source.
Deﬁnition 3 (Simulation). A simulation is a binary relation R on S such that whenever (s, t) ∈ R then λ(s) = λ(t), and whenever
s
a→ s′ then there is some t′ ∈ S such that t a→ t′ and (s′, t′) ∈ R. We say that t simulates s, written s t, if there is a simulation R
such that (s, t) ∈ R.
Simulation on two models M1 and M2 is deﬁned as simulation on their disjoint union M1 unionmultiM2. The transitions of
M1 unionmultiM2 are deﬁned by ini(s) a→ ini(s′) if s a→ s′ in Mi and its valuation by λ(ini(s)) = λi(s), where ini (for i ∈ {1, 2}) injects
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Fig. 1. Example speciﬁcation S = (M, E).
Si into S1 unionmulti S2. Simulation is extended to speciﬁcations (M1, E1) and (M2, E2) by deﬁning (M1, E1) (M2, E2) if there is a
simulation R onM1 unionmultiM2 such that for each s ∈ E1 there is some t ∈ E2 with (in1(s), in2(t)) ∈ R. Speciﬁcation S1 is simulation
equivalent toS2,writtenS1  S2, ifS1  S2 andS2  S1.Weextenddisjoint union to speciﬁcations (by (M1, E1) unionmulti (M2, E2) =
(M1 unionmultiM2, E1 unionmulti E2)) and show that simulation is preserved by disjoint union.
Theorem 4. If S1  T1 and S2  T2 then S1 unionmulti S2  T1 unionmulti T2.
2.2. Simulation logic
We deﬁne simulation logic in two steps: ﬁrst we deﬁne a basic modal logic, and then we add recursion by means of
equation systems. This results in a logic that is equally expressive as the modal -calculus with boxes and greatest ﬁxed
points only (cf. Bekicˇ [31]). However, the use of equation systems facilitates the deﬁnition of a normal form, where the
correspondence between formulae and speciﬁcations is immediate. In particular, this allows to compute maximal models
by transforming the equations into this normal form.
Let V be a countably inﬁnite set of propositional variables. Basic simulation logic is a variant of Hennessy–Milner logic [24]
without diamond modalities:
φ ::= ff | tt | p | ¬p | X | φ1 ∧ φ2 | φ1 ∨ φ2 | [a]φ
where p ∈ A, a ∈ L and X ∈ V . The interpretation ‖φ‖ρ of a basic formula φ is deﬁned with respect to a model M and an
environment ρ interpreting the propositional variables. The deﬁnition is standard (cf. Stirling [32]); in particular, for the box
modality we have s ∈ ‖ [a]φ‖ρ if and only if for all t ∈ S such that s a→ t we have t ∈ ‖φ‖ρ. Formulae like p or ¬p are called
literals. We use n-ary versions of conjunction and disjunction, setting
∨
∅ = ff (false) and∧∅ = tt (true). As usual, for ﬁnite
K ⊆ L, we write [K]φ for∧a∈K [a]φ and [−]φ for [L]φ.
To make the logic expressive enough to characterise all ﬁnite models, we follow Larsen [23] and add recursion to basic
simulation logic by introducing modal equation systems. A modal equation system 	 is a ﬁnite set of deﬁning equations of
the shape X = φX , where X is a propositional variable and φX is a formula of basic simulation logic. The deﬁned variables X
are pairwise distinct and bound in 	, while all other variables are free. For a simpler presentation, we restrict our attention
here to closed equation systems without free variables.
Since the considered equations systems are closed, it is sufﬁcient to work with environments ρ : bv(	) → P(S) mapping
the bound variables of	 to sets of states. The equations in	 induce amap
	 : P(S)bv(	) → P(S)bv(	) on such environments ρ
deﬁnedby
	(ρ)(X) = ‖φX‖ρ. A solutionof	 is an environmentρ such that all equations in	 are satisﬁed (that is,
	(ρ) = ρ),
and is thus a ﬁxed point of 
	 . Environments are ordered by point-wise inclusion. The semantics of a modal equation system
	 with respect to a modelM, denoted ‖	‖, is its greatest solution. By the Knaster-Tarski ﬁxed point theorem [33] a greatest
solution always exists, since 
	 is a monotone function on the complete lattice of environments ordered by point-wise set
inclusion.
Deﬁnition 5 (Simulation logic). A (closed) formula of simulation logic has the shape φ[	], where φ is a formula of basic
simulation logic and 	 is a (closed) modal equation system such that all variables occurring in φ are bound in 	. The
semantics of φ[	] with respect to model M is deﬁned by ‖φ[	]‖ = ‖φ‖‖	‖. We say a speciﬁcation (M, E) satisﬁes φ[	],
written (M, E) |= φ[	], if E ⊆ ‖φ[	]‖.
Example 6. Consider the formula φ = (X ∨ Y)[	], where
	 =
[
X = [ε]Y ∧ [a]X ∧ p
Y = [ε] (X ∧ Y) ∧ ¬q
]
.
Let us determine the semantics of this formula with respect to the speciﬁcation S in Fig. 1. The greatest ﬁxed point ‖	‖
of 
	 with respect to S can be computed in the standard way by iteration of 
	 starting with ρ0 = {X → S,Y → S}, where
S = {s1, s2, s3}. This yields ‖	‖ = {X → {s1},Y → {s2}}. So, E = ‖X ∨ Y‖‖	‖ = {s1, s2}, and hence speciﬁcation S satisﬁes φ.
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Henceforth, we often omit the equation system	 from φ[	] if no confusion can arise.We say that φ1 is a logical consequence
of φ0, written φ0  φ1, if for all speciﬁcations S , S |= φ0 implies S |= φ1. The formula φ0 is logically equivalent to φ1, written
φ0 ≡ φ1, if φ0  φ1 and φ1  φ0.
Simulation logic is equally expressive as the modal -calculus [8] without diamond modalities and least ﬁxed points.
The translation from this fragment of the modal -calculus to simulation logic is straightforward and replaces each ﬁxed
point by an equation. As an example, the formula νX.p1 ∧ (νY .X ∧ [a] (p2 ∨ Y)) is translated into the equivalent formula
X[X = p1 ∧ Y ,Y = X ∧ [a] (p2 ∨ Y)] of simulation logic. The translation in the other direction is based on Bekicˇ’s principle (cf.
[34,31]), which expresses a ﬁxed point in a product lattice in terms of a vector of component-wise ﬁxed points.
2.3. Weak simulation and logic
Often, one is only interested in the observable behaviour of systems. To achieve this, one can identify a distinguished
action ε ∈ A, called the silent action, and deﬁne weak transitions s a⇒ t in terms of the usual (strong) transitions as follows:
s
ε⇒ t whenever s( ε→)∗t, and s a⇒ t whenever s ε⇒ a→ ε⇒ t for all a /= ε. Weak simulationw (weak simulation equivalencew)
is then deﬁned as simulation (simulation equivalence) with respect to weak transitions. Similarly, we can interpret the box
modality of simulation logic over the weak transitions rather than the strong transitions of models. To distinguish the two
interpretations, we shall redeﬁne the notion of satisfaction and write S |=w φ in that case. Thus, S |=w [a]φ holds if and only
if all states that can be reached from some entry state of S by a transition labelled a, preceded and followed by an arbitrary
number of ε-steps, satisfy φ.
Example 7. Consider again the speciﬁcation in Fig. 1. Then (M, {s1}) |=w [ε]p, but not (M, {s3}) |=w [a] q, since s3 a⇒ s2 but
s2 does not satisfy the atomic proposition q.
3. Representation results
This section relates simulation logic to simulation by deﬁning two mappings, χ and θ . The mapping χ translates each
ﬁnite speciﬁcation into a formula, while θ translates formulae into (ﬁnite) speciﬁcations. The latter map is ﬁrst deﬁned on
formulae in so-called simulation normal form (SNF), and is then extended to all formulae by showing howany formula can be
transformed intoanequivalentone inSNF.Weshowthatχ logically characterises simulationand θ behaviourally characterises
logical satisfaction. These two maps form a Galois connection between ﬁnite speciﬁcations ordered by simulation and
formulae ordered by logical consequence. Similar results for somewhat different settings appear in [22,23,9]. In this paper,
we present a novel procedure to construct maximal models, which is similar to the construction by Boudol and Larsen [22],
but handles greatest ﬁxed points. In contrast to constructions for other branching-time logics [6,21], we do not directly build
the model, but proceed by a step-wise transformation of the formula into an equivalent one in SNF, which is isomorphic to
the desired maximal model. Moreover, unlike in constructions for more expressive logics [25,26], our maximal models are
representable as standard transition systems. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst maximal model construction for
a fragment of the modal -calculus including the full expressive power of greatest ﬁxed points.
3.1. Characteristic formulae
First, we deﬁne the mapping from ﬁnite speciﬁcations to formulae. A ﬁnite speciﬁcation (M, E) is translated into its
characteristic formula χ(M, E) = φE[	M], where φE =
∨
s∈E Xs and 	M deﬁnes Xs for each s ∈ S by
Xs =
∧
a∈L
[a]
⎛
⎝∨
s
a→t
Xt
⎞
⎠ ∧ ∧
p∈λ(s)
p ∧
∧
q∈A−λ(s)
¬q
Recall that
∨
∅ = ff (false) and∧∅ = tt (true).
Example 8. Consider the speciﬁcation S displayed in Fig, 1. Its characteristic formula is χ(S) = (Xs1 ∨ Xs2 )[	], where
	 =
⎡
⎣Xs1 = [a] ff ∧ [ε]Xs2 ∧ p ∧ qXs2 = [a] (Xs1 ∨ Xs3 ) ∧ [ε] ff ∧ p ∧ ¬q
Xs3 = [a]Xs1 ∧ [ε]Xs2 ∧ ¬p ∧ ¬q
⎤
⎦ .
We have a variation of an earlier result by Larsen [23], stating that speciﬁcation S1 is simulated by the ﬁnite speciﬁcation
S2 whenever S1 satisﬁes the characteristic formula of S2.
Theorem 9. Let S1, S2 be speciﬁcations and suppose S2 is ﬁnite. Then S1  S2 if and only if S1 |= χ(S2).
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Note that using inﬁnite equation systems this theorem generalises to ﬁnitely branching S2.
3.2. Maximal models
The next step is to deﬁne the inverse mapping. Not all formulae correspond directly to a speciﬁcation, but those in
simulation normal form do.
Deﬁnition 10 (Simulation normal form). A formula φ[	] of simulation logic is in simulation normal form (SNF) if φ has the
form
∨X for some ﬁnite set X ⊆ bv(	) and all equations in 	 are in the following state normal form
X =
∧
a∈L
[a]
(∨
YX ,a
)
∧
∧
p∈BX
p ∧
∧
q∈A−BX
¬q
where each YX ,a ⊆ bv(	) is a ﬁnite set of variables and each BX ⊆ A is a set of atomic propositions.
Notice thatanycharacteristic formulaχ(S) is inSNF. Froma formula (∨X )[	] inSNFwederive thespeciﬁcation θ((∨X )[	]) =
((S, L,→,A, λ), E)where S = bv(	), E = X and, for eachX ∈ bv(	), the equation forX induces the transitions {X a→ Y | Y ∈ YX ,a}
and the valuation λ(X) = BX .
Lemma 11. χ and θ are each others inverse up to equivalence, that is,
(1) θ(χ(S))∼=S for ﬁnite S (where ∼= denotes isomorphism), and
(2) χ(θ(φ)) ≡α φ for φ in SNF (where ≡α denotes α-convertibility).
Here, isomorphism means a label-and-valuation-preserving bijection between the respective states and transitions.
For φ in SNF, the speciﬁcation θ(φ) is a maximal model of φ with respect to the simulation preorder, in the sense that it
simulates exactly those speciﬁcations that satisfy formula φ.
Theorem 12. For φ in SNF, we have S  θ(φ) if and only if S |= φ.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 9 by Lemma 11(2). 
3.3. Transformation to SNF
We now present a step-wise transformation of any simulation logic formula into a logically equivalent formula in SNF.
Before describing the transformation in detail, we introduce some auxiliary notions. First, we use a slightly non-standard
variant of disjunctive normal form: we say that a formula φ of basic simulation logic is in disjunctive normal form (DNF) if it
is a disjunction of conjunctions of box formulae and literals, i.e., it has the shape φ = ∨i(∧j [aij]ψij ∧∧Li) where Li are sets
of literals and ψij arbitrary formulae in basic simulation logic. Furthermore, the conjunctive decomposition c(ψ) of a formula
ψ into its conjuncts is given by c(ψ) = {ψ1, . . . ,ψm} such that no ψi is a conjunction and ψ =
∧
i ψi (modulo associativity and
commutativity). Note that c(tt) =∅. The elements of c(ψ) are called conjunctive components of ψ .
We call an occurrence of a subformula top-level if it is not under the scope of a box operator. We say that Y is unguarded in
φX , written X  Y , if there is a top-level occurrence of Y in φX . A modal equation system	 (or formula φ[	]) isweakly guarded
if the relation  is acyclic, and strongly guarded if  is empty.
Example 13. Consider the modal equation system
	 =
[
X = [a]X ∨ (q ∧ Y)
Y = [b] (X ∧ [a]Y) ∧ p
]
Variable X is guarded in φX (the only occurrence of X is under the scope of a box operator), but Y is not (it occurs on the
top-level). Both X and Y are guarded in φY . Hence,  = {(X ,Y)} being acyclic but not empty, 	 is weakly guarded but not
strongly guarded.
Any weakly guarded formula can be transformed into a strongly guarded one by repeatedly rewriting each unguarded
occurrence of a variable by its deﬁning equation. Moreover, using a result of Walukiewicz [35] we can also show that any
formula of simulation logic can be transformed into an equivalent weakly guarded one (and thus into a strongly guarded
one).
After these auxiliary deﬁnitions, we are ready to present the transformation. It consists of three phases:
Phase I transforms each equation into a disjunction of formulae in state normal form, where only single variables appear
under modalities,
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Fig. 2. Maximal model for φ = [b] ff ∧ p.
Phase II splits top-level disjunctions in each equation into a set of new equations, one for each disjunct, yielding an equation
system in state normal form, and
Phase III is an optimisation phase removing unreachable and redundant equations.
The transformation into SNF uses a partial function h that keeps track how sets of formulae are mapped to variables. This
map avoids the repeated introduction of new equations for the same formula, which is essential for the termination of the
transformation. If hmaps a set of formulae 
 to variable X , this means that an equation X = ∧
 (such that c(∧
) = 
) has
been introduced earlier and that variable X should be used instead of introducing any further equation for
∧

.
Before going into the details, let us illustrate the basic ideas on a simple example. A more elaborate transformation
example appears in Section 8.3.1.
Example 14. Let φ = [b] ff ∧ p be interpreted as a formula over L = {a, b} and A = {p}. This formula holds for speciﬁcations,
where each initial state satisﬁes p and has no outgoing b transition. We ﬁrst translate φ to (
∨X0)[	0] with X0 = {X} and
	0 = {X = [b] ff ∧ p}. In the following, the numbers in parentheses refer to the transformation steps detailed below.
The equation forX is already strongly guarded (I.1) and inDNF (I.2). Next, we add themissing box [a] using the equivalence
tt ≡ [a] tt (I.3), yielding X = [a] tt ∧ [b] ff ∧ p. In the next step (I.4), we introduce new variables for the formulae under the
boxes: Y = tt and Z = ff. This is recorded in h with two new entries: (∅,Y) (since tt = ∧∅) and ({ff}, Z). The equation for X
becomes
X = [a]Y ∧ [b] Z ∧ p
which is already in state normal form.We proceedwith Y = tt. Again, the ﬁrst stepwith an effect adds themissing boxes (I.3),
producing Y = [a] tt ∧ [b] tt. Next, since c(tt) =∅ and h(∅) = Y , we know that Y stands for tt, so we replace the subformulae
tt under the boxes by Y , yielding Y = [a]Y ∧ [b]Y . To get a disjunction of state normal forms, we add the missing literals in
positive and negative form, yielding
Y = ([a]Y ∧ [b]Y ∧ p) ∨ ([a]Y ∧ [b]Y ∧ ¬p).
The third equation Z = ff (= ∨∅) is already a (trivial) disjunction of state normal forms. Note that X remains unchanged
in Phase I. Thus, at the end of Phase I we have the following equation system.
	 =
⎡
⎣X = [a]Y ∧ [b] Z ∧ pY = ([a]Y ∧ [b]Y ∧ p) ∨ ([a]Y ∧ [b]Y ∧ ¬p)
Z = ff
⎤
⎦
Next, Phase II splits each top-level disjunction into a set of new equations and substitutes the disjunction of new variables
for the original variable. Concretely, all occurrences of Y are replaced by Y1 ∨ Y2 and Z = ff (=
∨
∅) is substituted back into
φX , yielding
	 =
⎡
⎣X = [a] (Y1 ∨ Y2) ∧ [b] ff ∧ pY1 = [a] (Y1 ∨ Y2) ∧ [b] (Y1 ∨ Y2) ∧ p
Y2 = [a] (Y1 ∨ Y2) ∧ [b] (Y1 ∨ Y2) ∧ ¬p
⎤
⎦
Since X is not split into several equations, X = {X} remains unchanged. Phase III is the identity transformation in this
example as there are no unreachable or duplicate equations. Thus, the ﬁnal result is X[	], which is in simulation normal
form. The derived maximal model θ(X[	]) is displayed in Fig. 2. Indeed, it simulates exactly all those speciﬁcations where
each initial state satisﬁes p and has no outgoing b transition.
We nowdescribe the actual transformation in detail.We assumewithout loss of generality that the initial formula has the
shape X0[	0], where 	0 is weakly guarded (since any formula can be transformed into a weakly guarded one). We initialise
X = {X0}, 	 = 	0 and h =∅.
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Phase I (disjunction of state normal forms)
This phase transforms each equation into a disjunction of formulae in state normal form. Its steps are applied once to
each equation including the new ones introduced in step I.4 below.
(1) (Strong guardedness)Make equation strongly guarded by repeated rewriting of unguarded occurrences of variables using
the original system 	0.
(2) (DNF) Put equation into disjunctive normal form and remove inconsistent disjuncts (those where ff or both p and ¬p
appear).
(3) (Box grouping and completion) Group boxes together using [a]φ1 ∧ [a]φ2 ≡ [a] (φ1 ∧ φ2) and add missing boxes to each
disjunct using tt ≡ [a] tt such that there is a box formula for each a ∈ L. The resulting equation shape is
X =
∨
i
(∧
a∈L
[a]ψia ∧
∧
Li
)
(4) (Modal depth reduction) Apply the following to each top-level box subformula [a]ψia where ψia is not a variable. If
(c(ψia),Y) ∈ h for some variable Y then replace [a]ψia by [a]Y ; otherwise, choose a fresh variable Z ∈ bv(	), add the new
equation Z = ψia to 	, replace [a]ψia by [a] Z and extend h to h ∪ {(c(ψia), Z)}. The equation shape is then
X =
∨
i
(∧
a∈L
[a] Zia ∧
∧
Li
)
(5) (Literal completion) Replace equation X = φ by X = φ ∧∧p∈A(p ∨ ¬p), then repeat step (2) to put equation back into DNF.
The equation shape is (for Bi ⊆ A)
X =
∨
i
⎛
⎝∧
a∈L
[a] Zia ∧
∧
p∈Bi
p ∧
∧
q∈A−Bi
¬q
⎞
⎠
Note that step (I.4) might introduce unguarded occurrences of variables in the newly added equations. Thus, the rewriting
step (I.1) is needed to bring these equations into strongly guarded form. For the termination of Phase I, it is crucial to use
the original equation system 	0 and not the current 	 in this step, because this limits the set of subformulae introduced by
the rewriting to those already occurring in 	0. This in turn guarantees that subsequent modal depth reductions in step (I.4)
eventually ﬁnd already existing variables for the subformulae under the box operator.
Phase II (push disjunctions inside)
This phase eliminates the top-level disjunctions by introducing a new equation for each disjunct, thus pushing these
disjunctions under box modalities. It is applied once to each equation in 	.
(1) Remove an equation of shape X = ∨ni=1 φi with n /= 1 from 	; note that this includes the case X = ff (for n = 0).
(2) Add a new equation Xi = φi for each non-variable disjunct φi and substitute
∨n
i=1 Xi for X in all equations of 	 (where Xi
is either identical to φi or Xi is the fresh variable introduced for φi).
(3) If X ∈ X then replace X by (X − {X}) ∪ {X1, . . . ,Xn}.
The resulting equation is in state normal form.
Phase III (optimisation)
This optimisation phase iteratively removes unreachable and duplicate equations.
(1) Remove equations Z = ψ from	 in case Z can not be reached fromany variable inX via variable dependencies (X depends
on Y if Y occurs in φX ).
(2) If there are equations Z1 = ψ1 and Z2 = ψ2 in 	 such that ψ1[Z1/Z2] = ψ2[Z1/Z2], then remove Z2 = ψ2 from 	 and
substitute Z1 for Z2 in the remaining equations as well as in X .
Theorem 15. The algorithm above terminates and transforms any formula φ of simulation logic into an equivalent formula snf(φ)
in simulation normal form.
Proof. (Sketch; full proof in [36]) LetXi,	i and hi denote the values ofX ,	 and h after i transformation steps.We concentrate
in this sketch on Phase I, which preserves the following two invariants:
J1. for all Y ∈ bv(	0) we have Y ∈ bv(	i) and Y [	i] ≡ Y [	0], and
J2. if (
, Z) ∈ hi then 
 ⊆ 
0, where 
0 is deﬁned as the set of conjunctive components of subformulae appearing under
some box modality in 	0, that is, 
0 =
⋃{c(ψ) | ∃a. [a]ψ is a subformula of 	0}.
Preservation of the semantics by the transformation steps follows from J1 and the fact that X is constant in Phase I. To
see that Phase I terminates, note ﬁrst that step I.1 terminates, because 	0 is weakly guarded (by assumption) and all steps
preserve weak guardedness. Overall non-termination of Phase I due to the introduction of equations in step I.4 is ruled out
by J2: since 
0 is ﬁnite, the map h eventually ﬁlls up and thus Phase I terminates. 
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Weextendthemapping θ toall formulaeof simulation logicbydeﬁning θ(φ) = θ(snf(φ)). Sincesnfpreserves thesemantics,
Theorem 12 can be extended to all formulae, showing that θ(φ) is the maximal model of φ with respect to the simulation
preorder.
Theorem 16. S  θ(φ) if and only if S |= φ.
We conclude with two important consequences of Theorems 9 and 16. The ﬁrst one is that simulation preserves logical
properties.
Corollary 17. S1  S2 and S2 |= φ imply S1 |= φ.
The second corollary expresses that themaps χ and θ form aGalois connection between the preorder (S,) of (isomorphism
classes of) ﬁnite speciﬁcations ordered by simulation and be the preorder (L,) of formulae of simulation logic ordered by
logical consequence.
Corollary 18. χ and θ are monotone and, for ﬁnite speciﬁcations S , S  θ(φ) if and only if χ(S)  φ.
3.4. Representation results for weak simulation
A natural question is whether the results of the previous subsection can be used to relate weak simulation and simulation
logic in the same way as simulation and simulation logic are related by the transformation θ (and its adjoint map χ). Note
that applying θ on a formula of simulation logic interpreted over weak transitions would only give us a model in terms of
weak transitions, without the underlying strong transitions. However, there is a standard translation of formulae interpreted
over weak transitions into equivalent formulae interpreted over strong transitions [32]. This translation, let us denote it by
δ, is easily adapted to our setting. It has the property that S |=w φ exactly when S |= δ(φ). We show that θ ◦ δ provides the
desired transformation relating weak simulation and simulation logic.
To this end, we ﬁrst introduce the notion of saturated model, i.e., a model in which s
a→ t whenever s a⇒ t. We show that
for all formulae φ, θ (δ (φ)) is simulation equivalent to its saturation, and therefore it is sufﬁcient for a model to be weakly
simulated by θ (δ (φ)) in order to satisfy φ when interpreted over weak transitions.
Deﬁnition 19 (Saturation). Let M = (S, L,→,A, λ) be a model. The saturation of M is the model sat(M) = (S, L,→s,A, λ) in
which s
a→s t exactly when s a⇒ t for all a. The saturation of a speciﬁcation (M, E) is the speciﬁcation sat(M, E) = (sat(M), E).
Thus, sat(M) is the least saturated model with respect to the subset ordering on the powerset of S × L × S, containing M.
For instance, in themodel given in Fig. 1 above, we have to add the transition si
a→ sj for all i and j and ε-self-loops to saturate
the model. We have s
a⇒s t in sat(S)whenever s a→s t in sat(S)whenever s a⇒ t in S . As consequences, we have the following
properties of weak simulation and simulation logic.
Proposition 20. We have
(i) S1 w S2 iff S1  sat(S2), and
(ii) S |=w φ iff sat(S) |=w φ iff S |= δ(φ).
Lemma 21. sat(θ (δ (φ)))  θ (δ (φ)) .
Proof. Clearly, θ (δ (φ)) sat(θ (δ (φ))) holds; it remains to show the other direction. From reﬂexivity of and Theorem 16
we know that θ (δ (φ)) |=δ(φ). Then, by Proposition 20(ii), sat(θ (δ (φ))) |=δ(φ), and again by Theorem 16, sat(θ (δ (φ))) θ
(δ (φ)). 
These results allow the following characterisation of simulation logic, in the style of Theorem 16.
Theorem 22. S w θ (δ (φ)) if and only if S |=w φ.
Proof. By Proposition 20(i) and Lemma 21 the following statements are equivalent: (a) S w θ (δ (φ)), (b) S  sat(θ (δ (φ))),
and (c) S  θ (δ (φ)). Theorem 16 together with Proposition 20(ii) then establish the result. 
Corollary 23. S1 w S2 and S2 |=w φ imply S1 |=w φ.
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Fig. 3. A method graph.
4. Programmodel
This section uses the notions developed above to formally deﬁne applet structure and behaviour, structural and be-
havioural simulation logic, and maximal applets. The next section then shows how these support compositional veriﬁcation
of control-ﬂow-based safety properties of applets.
4.1. Applet structure
Wemodel the control structure of an applet as a collection of method speciﬁcations. We ﬁrst deﬁne the notion of applet
interface as the sets of methods which are provided and called by an applet. We shall need this notion for constructing
maximal applets. LetMeth be an inﬁnite set of method names (not containing the special symbols r and ε).
Deﬁnition 24 (Applet interface). An applet interface is a pair I = (I+, I−), where I+, I− ⊆ Meth are ﬁnite sets of names of
provided and required methods, respectively. We say I is closed if I− ⊆ I+. The composition of two interfaces I1 = (I+1 , I−1 ) and
I2 = (I+2 , I−2 ) is deﬁned by I1 ∪ I2 = (I+1 ∪ I+2 , I−1 ∪ I−2 ).
Next, we deﬁne method speciﬁcations, which are the basic building blocks of applets. Each method is described by its
control-ﬂow graph and a set of entry points.
Deﬁnition 25 (Method speciﬁcation). A method graph for m ∈ Meth over a set M of method names is a ﬁnite model Mm =
(Vm, Lm,→m,Am, λm), where Vm is the set of control nodes of m, Lm = M ∪ {ε}, Am = {m, r}, m ∈ λm(v) for all v ∈ Vm, i.e., each
node is tagged with themethod name. Amethod speciﬁcation form ∈ Meth overM is a speciﬁcation (Mm, Em) such thatMm
is a method graph form overM.
The nodes labelled with the distinguished atomic proposition r are the return points ofm.
Example 26. Fig. 3 shows the method graph for the following Java-like method m:
void m() {if c() {p()} else x = 3}
An applet is a collection of method speciﬁcations.
Deﬁnition 27 (Applet). Applets A with interface I, written A : I, are inductively deﬁned by
• 0M : (∅,M), where 0M is the empty applet overM deﬁned by 0M = ((∅,M ∪ {ε},∅, {r},∅),∅),
• (Mm, Em) : ({m},M) if (Mm, Em) is a method speciﬁcation form overM,
• A1 unionmultiA2 : I1 ∪ I2 if A1 : I1 and A2 : I2.
An applet A : I is closed if its interface I is closed.
This deﬁnition requires that each providedmethodm ∈ I+ of an appletA : I has to be implemented in amethod graph form.
The interface of an applet can be derived from its implementation: a straightforward induction shows that if A is an applet
built from a model over L and A then its interface is (A− {r}, L − {ε}). We write S : I for an arbitrary speciﬁcation S to mean
that S is (isomorphic to) an applet with interface I. Note that, up to isomorphism, applet composition unionmulti is associative and
commutative with neutral element 0∅.
We have developed a tool to extract applet graphs from Java Card byte code. The tool is based on the SOOT framework
(see Section 7).
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Fig. 4. Maximal applet for interface I = ({m1,m2}, {m1,m3}) and φ = tt.
4.1.1. Structural simulation and logic
Structural simulation on applets coincides with simulation on the speciﬁcations deﬁning the applets. For conveniencewe
writeA1 s A2 instead ofA1  A2 to denote structural simulation. Since applet composition corresponds to disjoint union,
structural simulation is preserved by applet composition (cf. Theorem 4).
Corollary 28. If A1 s B1 and A2 s B2 then A1 unionmultiA2 s B1 unionmulti B2.
We also instantiate (weak) simulation logic to this level. For an applet A : I and a formula φ of simulation logic over
L = I− ∪ {ε} and A = I+ ∪ {r} we write for clarity A |=s φ instead of A |= φ and A |=s,w φ instead of A |=w φ.
4.2. Maximal applet structures
In general, the maximal model of a given formula in structural simulation logic is not a legal applet structure. What we
are interested in, then, is computing amaximal applet for the formula, i.e., an applet structurewhich satisﬁes the formula and
which structurally simulates all other applets satisfying the formula. This problem, however, can only be solved for a ﬁxed
applet interface: one can axiomatise applet structures within structural simulation logic for a given interface. This allows the
maximal model construction presented above to be used for computing a maximal applet for a given formula in structural
simulation logic.
Deﬁnition 29 (Interface formula). Let I = (I+, I−) be an applet interface. Deﬁne φI[	I], the interface formula for I, by
φI =
∨
m∈I+ Xm
	I = {Xm = [I−, ε]Xm ∧ pm | m ∈ I+}
pm = m ∧∧{¬m′ | m′ ∈ I+,m′ /= m}
The formula φI[	I] axiomatises the basic structure of an applet with interface I, namely, each initial node belongs to a unique
methodm and no transition leavesm. Note that 	I is not in SNF (proposition r is missing).
The maximal applet with respect to a formula φ and interface I is deﬁned as the maximal model of φ conjoined with the
interface formula for I.
Deﬁnition 30 (Maximal applet). The maximal applet with respect to interface I and formula φ[	] is deﬁned as θI(φ[	]) =
θ(φ ∧ φI[	,	I]) (where it is assumed without loss of generality that the bound variables of 	 and 	I are disjoint).
Example 31. The interface formula for interface I = ({m1,m2}, {m1,m3}) is given by the formula φI[	I], where φI = Xm1 ∨ Xm2
and
	I =
[
Xm1 = [m1,m3, ε]Xm1 ∧m1 ∧ ¬m2
Xm2 = [m1,m3, ε]Xm2 ∧m2 ∧ ¬m1
]
The maximal applet for interface I (and formula φ = tt) is shown in Figure 4.
The following result records the main properties of interface formulae and maximal applets.
Theorem 32. Let I be an applet interface. For any speciﬁcation S = (M, E) over labels L = I− ∪ {ε} and atomic propositions
A = I+ ∪ {r} we have (whereR denotes the reachable part of a speciﬁcation, as deﬁned on page 844)
(1) S |=s φI if and only ifR(S) : I, and
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(2) S s θI(φ) if and only if S |=s φ andR(S) : I.
Proof. (1) (Sketch) “⇒” By an induction on the size of I+. The restriction to the reachable part of S is required, because
the formula φI does not constrain the unreachable parts of S . “⇐” By inspection of the deﬁnition of applets. (2) Using the
deﬁnition of θI(φ) and Theorem 16we know that S s θI(φ) is equivalent to S |=s φ and S |=s φI . The result then follows from
(1). 
Point (1) of the theorem essentially expresses that the formula φI characterises those speciﬁcations that are applets with
interface I, while point (2) extends Theorem 16 from speciﬁcations to applets. As a consequence of (2) we have θI(φ) |= φI
and θI(φ) : I, since all nodes of θI(φ) are reachable by construction.
4.3. Applet behaviour
Next, we change our focus to the behavioural level, where we ﬁrst deﬁne the operational semantics of a closed applet.
Since our compositional veriﬁcation method is based on structural assumptions, there is no need to compose applets on
the behavioural level, so an operational semantics of closed applets is sufﬁcient. This is in contrast with previous work on
semi-automatic compositional applet veriﬁcation [7] where the use of behavioural assumptions required a more involved
open semantics of applets.
Applet behaviour can be described in terms of Pushdown Automata. We also present an equivalent formulation of applet
behaviour, deﬁning it directly in terms of a model. Applet behaviour is closely connected with applet structure, in the sense
that simulation of applet structure immediately carries over to simulation of applet behaviours. This will be exploited in the
next section, when presenting the compositional veriﬁcation principle.
4.3.1. Applet behaviour as Pushdown Automaton
Pushdown Automata provide a natural execution model for programs with recursion. They form a well-studied class of
inﬁnite state systems for which many important problems like bisimulation equivalence and model checking are decidable
(see e.g., [10,5] for analysis techniques and [3,2] for applications). Applet behaviour can be described directly in terms of
Pushdown Automata.
Deﬁnition 33 (PDA). A non-deterministic Pushdown Automaton is a tuple P = (Q ,	,,,Q ′,⊥) where Q is a set of control
states, 	 a ﬁnite input alphabet,  a ﬁnite stack alphabet, Q ′ ⊆ Q are the start states, ⊥ ∈  is the initial stack symbol, and
 ⊆ (Q × ) × 	 × (Q × ∗) a set of labelled productions (or rewrite rules) of the shape (q1,A) a↪→ (q2, γ ).
A conﬁguration of a PDA is a pair (q, γ ) ∈ Q × ∗. The set of conﬁgurations Q ′ × {⊥} are called initial conﬁgurations. The
set of productions induces a labelled transition relation on conﬁgurations as the least relation which contains the initial
conﬁgurations and is closed under the preﬁx rewrite rule: (q1,A · γ ′) a→ (q2, γ · γ ′) whenever (q1,A) a↪→ (q2, γ ) ∈ .
Applet behaviour is induced from the applet PDA through the preﬁx rewrite rule. The connection between applet structure
and applet PDA is established through the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 34 (Applet PDA). Let A = (M, E) : (I+, I−) be a closed applet such that M = (V , L,→,A, λ). Then PA = (V , Lb,V ∪
{⊥},, E,⊥) is the PDA induced by Awhere
Lb = {m1 l m2 | l ∈ {call, ret}, m1,m2 ∈ I+} ∪ {ε}
 = {(v, v⊥) ε↪→ (v′, v⊥) | v |= ¬r ∧ v →m v′}
∪ {(v1, v⊥)
m1 callm2
↪→ (v2, v′1 · v⊥) | v1 |= ¬r ∧ v1
m2−→m1 v′1∧ v2 |= m2 ∧ v2 ∈ E}
∪ {(v2, v1)
m2 retm1
↪→ (v1, ε) | v2 |= r ∧ v2 |= m2 ∧ v1 |= m1}
where v⊥ ranges over V ∪ {⊥}.
Note that the valuation λ also applies to PDA control states and is lifted to conﬁgurations by deﬁning λˆ((v, v⊥)) = λ(v).
4.3.2. Applet behaviour by transition rules
An alternative approach is to describe applet behaviour explicitly as a speciﬁcation, by deﬁning appropriate transition
rules.
Deﬁnition 35 (Behaviour). Let A = (M, E) : (I+, I−) be a closed applet such that M = (V , L,→,A, λ). The behaviour of A is
described by the speciﬁcation b(A) = (Mb, Eb), where Mb = (Sb, Lb,→b,Ab, λb) is deﬁned by Sb = V × V*, that is, states are
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Table 1
Applet transition rules
[transfer] (v, σ)
τ→ (v′ , σ) if v ε→ mv′ , v |= ¬r
[call] (v1, σ)
m1 callm2−→ (v2, v′1 · σ) if m1,m2 ∈ I+ , v1
m2−→m1 v′1, v1 |= ¬r,
v2 |= m2, v2 ∈ E
[return] (v2, v1 · σ) m2 retm1−→ (v1, σ) if m1,m2 ∈ I+ , v2 |= m2 ∧ r, v1 |= m1
pairs of control points and stacks, Lb = {m1 l m2 | l ∈ {call, ret}, m1,m2 ∈ I+} ∪ {ε}, →b is deﬁned by the transition rules of
Table 1, Ab = A and λb((v, σ)) = λ(v). The set of initial states Eb is deﬁned by Eb = E × {ε}.
A simple inspection of the rules in Table 1 and Deﬁnition 34 shows that the behaviour induced by the applet PDA through
the preﬁx rewrite rule is isomorphic to the explicitly described applet behaviour.
4.3.3. Behavioural simulation and logic
AppletA1 behaviourally simulates appletA2,writtenA1 b A2, if b(A1) b(A2). Similarly,we instantiate simulation logic
on the behavioural level. Behavioural properties are more abstract than structural ones as they do not refer to the program
control structure.We deﬁne behavioural satisfactionA |=b ψ as b(A) |= ψ for appletsA : I andψ a formula of simulation logic
over Lb and Ab. Similarly, weak behavioural satisfaction A |=b,w ψ is deﬁned as b(A) |=w ψ . Since applet behaviour coincides
with behaviour of a Pushdown Automaton, verifying goals of the shapeA |=b ψ (orA |=b,w ψ) can be reduced to PDA model
checking, for which standard algorithms exist.
4.3.4. Simulation correspondence
The notions of applet structure and behaviour have been deﬁned so as to ensure that any two applets related by structural
simulation are also related by behavioural simulation. In general, the inverse does not hold, because due to recursion,method
graphs can contain nodes that are never reachable at the behavioural level.
Theorem 36 (Simulation correspondence). If A1 s A2 then A1 b A2.
Proof. Let R be a structural simulation betweenA1 andA2. We lift R from the structural level to Rb on the behavioural level
by deﬁning ((v, σ), (v′, σ ′)) ∈ Rb if and only if (v, v′) ∈ R, |σ | = |σ ′| and (σ (i), σ ′(i)) ∈ R for all 0 i < |σ |. It is easy to check that
Rb is a behavioural simulation between A1 and A2. 
As a consequence, in the set of applets satisfying a given structural formula φ[	], the maximal applet for this formula
(with respect to structural simulation) θI(φ[	]) is also maximal with respect to behavioural simulation.
4.4. Behavioural maximal applets
Deﬁning the maximal applet behaviour for a given behavioural formula is more problematic. As in the structural case, in
general, themaximal model of a formula in behavioural simulation logic is not a legal applet behaviour. Unlike the structural
case, however, one cannot axiomatise applet behaviour within behavioural simulation logic (in order to use the maximal
model construction for generating maximal applet behaviours), since simulation logic is only able of capturing regular
properties and not the context-free properties exhibited by Pushdown Automata.
Furthermore, amaximal applet behaviourwould in general be inﬁnite-state; therefore, amaximal behaviour construction
has to return a ﬁnite representation of this behaviour. The obvious (but not only) choice for such a representation would be
an applet structure. Given a formula in behavioural simulation logic, the problem then reduces to ﬁnding an applet which
satisﬁes the formula andwhich behaviourally simulates all other applets satisfying the formula. However, in general such a
maximal applet is not unique.
Example 37. Consider the behavioural formula [m1 callm2] r over an interface I = ({m1,m2}, {m1,m2}). The formula gives
rise to two maximal applets:
(1) the maximal applet for I, but without edges labelled m2 whose source is a non-return entry node of m1 (representable
as θI(¬m1 ∨ r ∨ [m2] ff)), i.e., the applet wherem1 can never callm2 immediately; and
(2) the maximal applet for I, but where every entry point of m2 is valuated r (representable as θI(¬m2 ∨ r)), i.e., the applet
wherem2 always returns immediately.
Every applet satisfying the formula is behaviourally simulated by one of these two applets; however, neither of the two
applets simulates the other.
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We are currently investigating under what conditions and how such a collection of maximal applets can be characterised
exactly, by means of a translation from behavioural properties into collections of structural properties. Preliminary results
are presented by Gurov and Huisman in [11].
5. Compositional veriﬁcation
The results of the preceding sections form the basis for compositional veriﬁcation of applets using maximal models.
5.1. Structural properties
In the realmof structural properties, i.e.,whenglobal guarantees and local assumptions are all givenas structural formulae,
we obtain a compositional veriﬁcation principle of the desired form, embodied by the following rule:
(struct− comp) A |=s φ θI(φ) unionmulti B |=s ψA unionmulti B |=s ψ A : I
This principle states that in order to show that a composed appletA unionmulti B has a structural property ψ , it is sufﬁcient to ﬁnd
a structural property φ which is satisﬁed by A and for which θI(φ) unionmulti B |=s ψ . The rule is sound and complete. The proof of
this rule follows closely the (slightlymore involved) proof for rule (compos) presented below (Theorem 39), and is therefore
omitted. Verifying the premises is achieved by standard, ﬁnite-state model checking.
Since applet composition is commutative, one can apply the compositional reasoning principle alsowith respect to applet
B in the second premise of the rule to yield a further decomposition of the global property.
5.2. Behavioural properties
As explained above, decomposition of global behavioural properties is more problematic, as behavioural properties in
general do not give rise to unique maximal applets. We can represent the set of applets satisfying the local assumption by
a model that behaviourally simulates these applets, but this necessarily leads to approximative (i.e., sound but incomplete)
solutions, since such a model cannot be guaranteed to be a legal applet behaviour itself. However, by restricting local
assumptions to structural properties, we obtain a complete compositional veriﬁcation rule, thus avoiding the possibility of
false negatives. This rule exploits the result that structural simulation implies behavioural simulation (Theorem 36).
LetA : I and B : J be applets such that I ∪ J is closed and let φ and ψ be formulae of structural and behavioural simulation
logic, respectively. We propose a compositional veriﬁcation principle embodied by the following rule:
(compos)
A |=s φ θI(φ) unionmulti B |=b ψ
A unionmulti B |=b ψ
A : I
We establish soundness and completeness of the rule with the help of the following result, which characterises its second
premise.
Proposition 38. Let B : J be an applet and I an interface such that I ∪ J is closed. Then θI(φ) unionmulti B |=b ψ if and only if for all A : I
with A |=s φ we have A unionmulti B |=b ψ.
Proof. “⇒” Suppose θI(φ) unionmulti B |=b ψ , A : I and A |=s φ. Then certainly also R(A) : I and so we get As θI(φ) by Theorem
32(2). From Corollary 28 and Theorem 36 we derive that A unionmulti B b θI(φ) unionmulti B. Hence, A unionmulti B |=b ψ by Corollary 17. “⇐” By
Theorem 32(2) we have θI(φ) : I and θI(φ) |=s φ, thus θI(φ) unionmulti B |=b ψ . 
Theorem 39. Rule (compos) is sound and complete.
Proof. Soundness is immediate by Proposition 38. For completeness suppose A unionmulti B |=b ψ and set φ = χ(A). By Theorem 9
we haveA |=b χ(A). To establish the second premise of the rule, we use Proposition 38 and show C unionmulti B |=b ψ for an arbitrary
C : I with C |=s X (A). We use Theorem 9 to derive C s A. The result then follows by Theorem 36 and Corollaries 17 and 28.

Again, since applet composition is commutative, one can apply the compositional reasoning principle (compos) alsowith
respect to applet B in the second premise of the rule to yield a further decomposition of the global property.
Note that by taking B to be the empty applet∅J− , (compos) reduces to a rule relating behavioural properties to structural
ones:
(struct-beh)
A |=s φ θI(φ) |=b ψ
A |=b ψ
A : I
Thus, given appletA : I, the satisfaction of behavioural propertyψ can be reduced to the satisfaction of structural property
φ if and only if the maximal applet with respect to I and φ (behaviourally) satisﬁes property ψ .
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6. Interface abstraction
So far we have only considered applets where all provided methods are public, meaning that they can be called from
the outside. However, in practice the public methods will be implemented using private methods which are hidden from
the outside world. Thus, when one wishes to check that an actual applet implementation (using private methods) satisﬁes
a speciﬁed property, one needs to abstract away from the private methods, which are not observable from the outside. In
particular, in a compositional veriﬁcation setting, local assumptions (and global guarantees) will typically be expressed at
the public interface level of an applet, while the concrete applet implementationwill use privatemethods. For the case study
presented in Section 8, the ability to distinguish between public and private method is crucial to make veriﬁcation feasible.
Given an applet A with interface I = (I+, I−) and a set of public methods M ⊆ I+, we deﬁne the public interface of A by
Iˆ(M) = (M, I− − (I+ −M)). The methods in the set I+ −M are called privatemethods of A.
We introduce the notion of interface behaviour, which – intuitively speaking – projects the applet behaviour onto the
observable methods declared in the public interface. For the purpose of practical veriﬁcation, we present the interface
abstraction of an applet, produced by an inlining algorithm, which over-approximates the applet’s interface behaviour by
inlining its private methods. We also show that, under the (very common) restriction that an applet is last-call recursive, an
inlined applet is weakly simulation equivalent to the interface behaviour of the original applet. We then propose a modiﬁed
principle for compositional veriﬁcation based on the interface abstraction of applets and the maximal model obtained for
the public interface of the corresponding applet.
6.1. Interface behaviour
The next section deﬁnes an inlining algorithm that transforms a concrete applet implementation into an applet that
contains only method calls to public methods. We want to prove that for any closed applet, every behaviour of the concrete
applet is also a behaviour of the inlined applet. However, for this to hold, we have to abstract the concrete behaviour to the
level of public methods. Therefore, we introduce the notion of interface behaviour of an applet with respect to a set of public
methodsM.
First, we deﬁne the top public method with respect toM, which for a given call stack σ is the ﬁrst public method to which
a node in the call stack belongs. For convenience, below we will often write the states of the behavioural model as a simple
sequence of states, i.e., v · σ , instead of (v, σ). We use reverse indexing to denote the ith element from the back of a sequence,
so that (v · σ)|σ | = v (where |σ | denotes the length of sequence σ ), and σ0 is the last element of σ . Let λMeth(v) denote the
method to which node v belongs.
topindexM(σ ) = max{i | 0 i < |σ | ∧ λMeth(σi) ∈ M}
topM(σ ) = λMeth(σ topindexM (σ ))
Using these deﬁnitions, we can deﬁne a relabelling ρM of transition labels to the public level. Labels for calls and returns
between public methods are left unchanged. A call from a private to a public method is relabelled as a call from the top
public method in the pending call stack. A return from a public to a private method is relabelled as a return to the top public
method. All other transitions get labelled as silent actions.
ρM((v, σ), ) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
 if  = m1{call/ret}m2 ∧ m1,m2 ∈ M
topM(σ ) callm2 if  = m1 callm2 ∧ m1 ∈ M,m2 ∈ M
m1 ret topM(σ ) if  = m1 retm2 ∧ m1 ∈ M,m2 ∈ M
ε otherwise
Now we are ready to deﬁne the interface behaviour of applet Awith respect to a set of public methodsM.
Deﬁnition 40 (Interface behaviour). Let A : I be a closed applet with behaviour b(A) = ((S, L,→,A, λ), E). LetM ⊆ I+ be a set
of public methods. The interface behaviour of A with respect to M is deﬁned as
bM(A) =
(
(S, LM ,→M ,AM , λM), EM
)
where
• LM = {m1 l m2 | m1,m2 ∈ M ∧ l ∈ {call, ret}} ∪ {}
• →M= {((v, σ), , (v′, σ ′)) | ∃a ∈ L. (v, σ) a→ (v′, σ ′) ∧ ρM((v, σ), a) =  }
• AM = M ∪ {r}
• λM = (v, σ) → {topM(v · σ)} ∪ if(v ∈ M ∧ v |= r) then {r}else∅
• EM = {v | v ∈ E ∧ λMeth(v) ∈ M}.
The interface behaviour of an applet also deﬁnes a Pushdown Automaton.
Proposition 41. The interface behaviour of A with respect to I+ is identical to its behaviour, i.e., bI+ (A) = b(A).
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We deﬁne behavioural interface simulationAMb B as bM(A) bM(B), andweak behavioural interface simulationAMb,w B
as bM(A)w bM(B). Notice thatA and B need not have the same interfaces – we only requireM ⊆ I+A andM ⊆ I+B . Similarly,
for any formula φ in simulation logic over LMand AM , we deﬁne behavioural interface satisfactionA |=M
b
φ as bM(A) |= φ, and
weak behavioural interface satisfaction A |=M
b,w
φ as bM(A) |=w φ.
6.2. The inlining transformation
Next we deﬁne an inlining algorithm αM that, given a set of public methodsM, transforms an applet graph by inlining all
private calls. Recursive calls to private methods are not inlined, but create loops in the resulting graph. We prove that the
interface behaviour of the original applet A is simulated by the behaviour of the inlined applet αM(A), thus (by Corollary
17) all properties φ of the latter, i.e., αM(A) |=b φ, are also properties of the former, i.e., A |=Mb φ. Moreover, we prove that if
the applet is last-call recursive, the two behaviours are weakly simulation equivalent – thus both applets satisfy exactly the
same observable properties at the public interface level.
Notice that the inlining algorithm does not require the applet to be closed: it treats all external methods as public.
6.2.1. The inlining algorithm
The algorithm is applied to each public method and (recursively) inlines all calls to private methods. Intuitively, con-
structing the transformed (or inlined) graph for a public method m corresponds to executing the interface behaviour of m,
where method calls to public methods are skipped and recursion is replaced by iteration. The nodes of the inlined applet
can thus be seen as states of the (interface) behaviour of the original applet, modulo an abstraction function which replaces
recursion by iteration.
During the inlining, each edge that represents internal transfer or a call to a public method is left unchanged. Each edge
that represents a call to a private method is replaced by two internal edges: one from the calling point to the entry point
of the method; and another from the return point of the method to the destination of the calling edge. If a method has
several entry or return points, several internal edges are created. The private method is inlined recursively. Each node is
replaced by a sequence denoting the fragment of the call stack from the activation of the public method up to the current
node (except for the case of a recursive call). Since we keep track of the pending call stack, we can recognise recursive
calls to private methods. In that case, the appropriate initial fragment of the call stack is used to decide the exact new
edges.
For the formal deﬁnition of the inlining algorithm, we need some new notions. LetA : I be an applet andM ⊆ I+ be a set
of public methods. An M-frame is a sequence of nodes σ of which only λMeth(σ0) is in M. An M-frame is called normal, if all
nodes in the frame belong to differentmethods. The nodes of the inlined applet are represented by normalM-frames derived
from the behaviour of the original applet. The abstraction function mentioned above (replacing recursion by iteration) is
formalised by means of the (normalising) conditional rewrite rule σ · v · σ ′ · v′ · σ ′′ ↪→ σ · v · σ ′′ if λMeth(v) = λMeth(v′) and
σ ′ · v′ · σ ′′ is a normal M-frame. Let ν(σ ) denote the normal form of σ with respect to the rule. Note that if σ is an M-frame,
then ν(σ ) is a normalM-frame. Moreover, for anyM-frame σ we have topM(σ ) = λMeth(σ0).
Further, for methodmwe deﬁne Int(m) and Call(M,m), denoting the sets of its internal edges and call edges with respect
to methods in a setM, respectively.
Int(m) = {(v, ε, v′) | v →m v′ ∧ v |= ¬r}
Call(M,m) = {(v,m′, v′) | v m′→m v′ ∧ v |= ¬r ∧ m′ ∈ M}
The deﬁnition of the inlining algorithm uses auxiliary functions η and ζ . The function η considers all edges related to
a method: it returns internal and public call edges with renamed nodes – using the pending call stack, and calls function
ζ on private call edges. Function ζ adds edges to the entry point, and from the return point of the private method, using
the pending call stack argument, and if necessary normalising the result (this uses the fact that the pending call stack is
always a normalisedM-frame). Then it checks if the private call is non-recursive, in which case the private method is inlined
recursively.
Deﬁnition 42 (Inlined applet). Let A : I be an applet, and let (M, P) be a partitioning of I+ into public and private methods,
respectively. We deﬁne the inlined applet
αM(A) = ((V ′, L′,→′,A′, λ′), E′)
where
• V ′ = {w ∈ V+ | w is a normalM-frame},
• L′ = (I− − P) ∪ {ε},
• →′= ⋃m∈M η(m, ) where
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Fig. 5. Example applet before and after inlining.
η(m, σ) = {(v · σ , , v′ · σ) | (v, , v′) ∈ Int(m) ∪ Call(I− − P,m)}
∪ ⋃{ζ(σ , (v,m′, v′)) | (v,m′, v′) ∈ Call(P,m)}
ζ(σ , (v,m′, v′)) = {(v · σ , ε, ν(e · v′ · σ)) | e |= m′ ∧ e ∈ E}
∪ {(ν(rt · v′ · σ), ε, v′ · σ) | rt |= (m′ ∧ r)}
∪ if ¬∃i. (0 i  |σ | ∧ (v′ · σ)i |= m′)
then η(m′, v′ · σ)else ∅
• A′ = M ∪ {r}
• λ′ = σ →{λMeth(σ0)} ∪ if (|σ | = 1 ∧ σ0 |= r) then {r}else∅
• E′ = {v ∈ E | λMeth(v) ∈ M}.
Before discussing properties of the inlining algorithm, we ﬁrst show an example.
Example 43. Suppose we have an applet as depicted in the left-hand column of Figure 5. Inlining this applet with the public
method set {m} results in the applet depicted in the right-hand column of Figure 5. Notice that all internal and public call
edges are preserved, while private method calls are replaced by two edges: to the entry and from the return point of the
called method, respectively.
6.2.2. Properties
We state several useful properties of the inlining algorithm. First of all, the inlining algorithm computes an applet having
as interface the public interface of the original applet.
Proposition 44. Let A : I be an applet and M ⊆ I+ a set of public methods. Then αM(A) is an applet with interface Iˆ(M), i.e.,
αM(A) : Iˆ(M).
By Proposition 41 we thus get:
bM(αM(A)) = b(αM(A))
Since the inlining transformation αM only inlines provided methods not inM, αI+ is the identity operation.
Proposition 45. Let A : I be an applet. Then αI+ (A) = A.
Finally, the inlining algorithm enjoys the following distributivity property.
Proposition 46. LetA : IA and B : IB be applets such that I+A and I+B are disjoint and let MA ⊆ I+A and MB ⊆ I+B be sets of public
methods such that I−A ⊆ I+A ∪MB and I−B ⊆ I+B ∪MA. Then
αMA∪MB (A unionmulti B) = αMA (A) unionmulti αMB (B)
6.2.3. Simulation results
As already mentioned, the interface behaviour of the original applet is over-approximated by the inlining algorithm,
i.e., every execution of the interface behaviour of A is an execution of the behaviour of αM(A). This is due to the close
correspondence between the interface behaviour of A and the structure of αM(A). We provide an “inlining” transformation
α′M on the states of b
M(A) by deﬁning α′M (v, σ) =
(
hd(γ ), tl(γ )
)
, where γ = βM(v · σ) and where βM(σ ) denotes the sequence
of normalised M-frames. Notice that we always have hd(hd(γ )) = hd(v · σ). We show that α′M is a simulation relating the
original interface behaviour with the inlined behaviour.
Theorem 47. Let A : I be a closed applet, and let M ⊆ I+. Then bM(A) b(αM(A)).
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Proof. We show by co-induction that α′M is a simulation between b
M(A) and b(αM(A)), i.e., we show that (1) the valuations
of (v, σ) in bM(A) and α′M(v, σ) in b(αM(A)) agree, and (2) if (v, σ)
l→(v′, σ ′) in bM(A), then we have α′M (v, σ) l→ α′M (v′, σ ′) in
b(αM(A)). The result then follows since α′M maps the entry states of bM(A) to entry states of b(αM(A)) (in fact, the entry states
coincide, and α′M maps every entry state to itself). It is easy to check that the valuations agree and that the transitions are
simulated. For the full proof we refer to our technical report [37]. 
Notice that in general we do not have behavioural simulation equivalence. The inlining construction introduces transfer
edges for calls to and returns from private methods. Because of the latter, the behaviour of the inlined applet can contain
a silent transition corresponding to a return from a private method in the original applet, even when the inlined applet
has not yet followed a silent transition corresponding to a call to this private method in the original applet. For instance,
the execution (v0, ε) → (v2.v1, ε) → (v4.v3.v1, ε) → (v7.v3.v1, ε) → (v3.v1, ε) → (v6.v3.v1, ε)m callm−→ (v0, v7.v3.v1) of the inlined
applet in Figure 5 does not correspond to any execution in the original applet. The inlining transformation thus introduces
new behaviours. Notice however, that these new behaviours are only observable in applets which are not last-call recursive.
A set of methods is recursive if every method in the set contains a (reachable) call edge to some method in the set. A call
edge is recursive if the calling and the called methods belong to some minimal (and thus, mutually) recursive method set. A
program is called last-call recursive if from any destination node of any recursive call edge, only transfer edges are reachable.
In addition, we shall assume that a return node is reachable from every such destination node.
For last-call recursive applets, we prove the reverse correspondence for observable behaviours.
Theorem 48. Let A : I be a closed last-call recursive applet, and let M ⊆ I+. Then b(αM(A))w bM(A).
Proof. Consider a state (w, γ ) in b(αM(A)), where λMeth(hd(w)) /∈ M andhd(w) |= r. For last-call recursive applets, the inlining
transformationαM has theproperty that for anysuchw, thenodesw
′ such that ν(hd(w) ·w′) = wbuthd(w) ·w′ /= w andwhich
are structurally reachable fromw in αM(A) form (together withw) a strongly connected component and are equivalent with
respect to structural simulation. As a consequence, in b(αM(A)), all states (w′, γ ) for a given γ also form a strongly connected
component and are weak simulation equivalent. Modulo such “return” equivalence classes, we show by co-induction that
(α′M)
−1 is aweak simulation between b(αM(A)) and bM(A). More exactly, we show that (1) the valuations of α′M(v, σ) and (v, σ)
agree, and (2) if α′M(v, σ)
l→ (w′, γ ′) is a transition in b(αM(A)) other than a (silent) transitionwithin a return equivalence class,
then (v, σ)
l⇒ (v′, σ ′) in bM(A) for some v′and σ ′ such that α′M(v′, σ ′) = (w′, γ ′) (inmost caseswe even show the corresponding
strong transition). The result then follows since α′M maps entry states of b(αM(A)) to entry states of bM(A). It is easy to check
that the valuations agree and that the transitions are simulated. For the full proof we again refer to [37]. 
Since weak simulation contains simulation we have the following.
Corollary 49. Let A : I be a closed last-call recursive applet, and let M ⊆ I+. Then bM(A) w b(αM(A)).
6.3. Interface abstraction and compositional reasoning
Using the results obtained above, we can state several veriﬁcation principles that can be used to prove properties of
applet interface behaviour. We ﬁrst present two abstraction principles, and then show how these can be combined with our
compositional veriﬁcation principle from Section 5.
6.3.1. Abstraction rules
Let A : I be a closed applet, and let M ⊆ I+. With the results established above, we can justify the following abstraction
principle (abstract), where ψ is a behavioural interface formula.
(abstract)
αM(A) |=b ψ
A |=M
b
ψ
Theorem 50. Rule (abstract) is sound.
Proof. Follows from the deﬁnition of behavioural satisfaction, Theorem 47, Corollary 17, and the deﬁnition of behavioural
interface satisfaction. 
When A is last-call recursive, we can even provide a faithful abstraction principle (weak-abstract) for properties of the
observable behaviour by using transformation δ mentioned in Section 3.4.
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(weak-abstract)
αM(A) |=b δ(ψ)
A |=M
b,w
ψ
Theorem 51. For last-call recursive applets A rule (weak-abstract) is sound and complete.
Proof. Follows fromthedeﬁnitionofbehavioural satisfaction, Proposition20(ii), Corollary49, Corollary23, and thedeﬁnition
of weak behavioural interface satisfaction, all of which are equivalences. 
6.3.2. Compositional reasoning
Let A :IA and B : IB be applets such that IA ∩ IB =∅ and let MA ⊆ I+A and MB ⊆ I+B be sets of public methods such that
I−A ⊆ I+A ∪MB and I−B ⊆ I+B ∪MA. The latter condition says that each applet only calls its ownmethods and the others’ public
methods and implies that their composition is closed. We combine the compositional veriﬁcation principle (compos) from
Section 5 with the abstraction principle (abstract) to obtain the following abstract compositional veriﬁcation principle:
(abstract-compos)
αMA (A) |=s φ θIˆ(MA)(φ) unionmulti αMB (B) |=b ψ
A unionmulti B |=MA∪MB
b
ψ
Notice that the maximal model construction is based on the public interface Iˆ(MA) = (MA, I−A − (I+A −MA)) of applet A.
Theorem 52. Rule (abstract-compos) is sound.
Proof. Follows from the soundness of (abstract) and (compos) together with Proposition 46. 
Similarly as for the abstraction principle, we can state a faithful compositional veriﬁcation principle (weak-abstract-compos)
for properties of the observable interface behaviour of applets which are last-call recursive:
(weak-abstract-compos)
αMA (A) |=s φ θIˆ(MA)(φ) unionmulti αMB (B) |=b δ(ψ)
A unionmulti B |=MA∪MB
b,w
ψ
Theorem 53. Rule (weak-abstract-compos) is sound and complete for last-call recursive applets A and B.
Notice that rule (weak-abstract-compos) is also sound for applets that are not last-call recursive: last-call recursiveness is
only needed to ensure completeness.
Our scenario for secure post-issuance loading of applets is based on the veriﬁcation principle embodied by these rules
and its derivatives. In particular, a combined application of rules (weak-abstract-compos) and (compos) yields the rule
(w(eak)-a(bstract)-c(ompos)-2), which we apply in our case study in Section 8:
(wac-2)
αMA (A) |=s φ αMB (B) |=s ξ θIˆ(MA)(φ) unionmulti θIˆ(MB)(ξ) |=b δ(ψ)
A unionmulti B |=MA∪MB
b,w
ψ
Here, an application of rule (compos) has introduced a secondmaximal model for the public interface of B and structural
property ξ . Notice that this rule is sound and complete for last-call recursive applets.
7. A tool set for compositional veriﬁcation
To support our compositional veriﬁcation method, we have developed a tool set implementing the various algorithms
presented above and providing translations into the input formats of appropriate, existing model checkers. Figure 6 gives a
general overview of the tool set.
As input we have for each applet either an implementation (in Java bytecode), or a structural property, restricting its
possible implementations, plus a public interface, specifying the methods provided and required by the applet. For these
inputs, we construct an applet representation according to Deﬁnition 27.
In case we have the applet implementation, we use the Applet Analyser to extract the concrete applet graph. The Applet
Analyser is a static analysis tool, built on top of the SOOT Java Optimisation Framework [12]. The byte code of an applet is
transformed into Jimple basic blocks, while abstracting away variables, method parameters, and calls to API methods. We
use SOOT’s standard class hierarchy analysis to produce a safe over-approximation of the call graph. If, for example, the
static analysis cannot determine the receiver of a virtual method call, a call edge is generated for every possible method
implementation. Next we use the Inliner, which is an Ocaml implementation of the inlining algorithm of Deﬁnition 42. The
Inliner takes the extracted method graph and the public interface as input, and produces the graph at the public interface
level.
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Fig. 6. Tool set for compositional applet veriﬁcation.
In case we have a structural property, we use the Maximal Model Constructor. This is an Ocaml implementation of the
SNF transformation as deﬁned in Section 3.3, which we use to construct maximal models. The structural properties and the
applet interface are used to produce an applet graph that simulates all possible implementations of applets respecting the
formula.
If required, the resulting applets can be composed with the unionmulti operator, which is basically a concatenation of the textual
graph representations. Since the applet analyser appends package names to the method names, there are no name conﬂicts
to be resolved here. Using the Model Generator the resulting applet graphs are translated into models which serve as input
for different model checkers. If we want to check structural properties, we exploit the fact that applet graphs can be viewed
as ﬁnite Kripke structures. Therefore, structural properties can be expressed in temporal logics and they can be checked
using standard model checking tools such as the ConcurrencyWorkbench (CWB) [38]. The Kripke structures of the CWB are
labelled transition systems generated from CCS process deﬁnitions. For this purpose, we use theModel Generator to convert
applet graphs into a representation as CCS processes. Since CCS does not have the notion of valuation, atomic propositions
p assigned to a node in an applet are represented by probes, that is, self-loops labelled by p. The translation also produces a
set of process constants corresponding to the entry nodes of the respective applet. To model check an applet graph against
a structural safety property, all initial states have to be checked individually. We encode the properties to be checked as -
calculus formulae, replacing atomic propositions p by 〈p〉 true. Since CWB supports parametrised formulae, our speciﬁcation
patterns can be encoded directly.
If for a composed system we want to verify whether it respects a behavioural safety property, we use the fact that the
behaviour of an applet is an inﬁnite statemodel generated by a PushdownAutomaton (PDA) given as a set of production rules
induced by the applet. Themodel checking problem for this class of models is exponential both in the size of the formula and
in the number of control states of the PDA [10]. Ideally we would like to use an existing model checker for PDAs (PDA MC).
Unfortunately, there is currently no efﬁcient tool available formodel checking (alternation-free)modal-calculus properties
of PDAs. We experimented with Alfred [39], a demonstrator tool implementing the model checking algorithm of Bouajjani
et al. [40], and we are currently developing such a model checker.
8. Case study
To evaluate its validity, we apply our compositional veriﬁcation method to a realistic smart card case study, which
illustrates typical unwanted applet interactions. The application, an electronic purse, has been provided by smart card
producer Gemplus as a test case for formal methods. Even though it is not actually used by Gemplus, it demonstrates all the
relevant issues related to smart card applications. In this section, we introduce the electronic purse case study, present the
local and global speciﬁcations for the different applets, and describe their veriﬁcation using the tool set presented above.
8.1. Illicit applet interactions in the electronic purse
The Gemplus electronic purse case study PACAP [41] is developed to provide a realistic case study for applying formal
methods to Java Card applications. It deﬁnes three applications: CardIssuer, Purse and Loyalty. Typically, a card will contain
one card issuer and one purse applet, but several loyalty applets. The case study has been previously used in connectionwith
several other formal techniques. For example, functional source code level speciﬁcations have been given and checked with
automatic and interactive veriﬁcation techniques [42]. The case study also has been used to illustrate an approach where
different privacy levels are assigned to information, andmodel checking is used to ensure that the information ﬂow respects
the restrictions imposed by these privacy levels [43]. The property described in the latter work motivates the property we
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study here. However, our technique is more general, allowing the veriﬁcation of arbitrary behavioural control-ﬂow safety
properties.
The property that we verify for this case study is only concerned with Purse and Loyalty, we shall therefore not discuss
CardIssuer any further. If the card holder wishes to join a loyalty program, the appropriate applet can be loaded on the card.
Subsequently, the purse and the different loyalties will exchange information about the purchases made, so that the loyalty
points can be credited. Current versions of Java Card use sharable interfaces to exchange this kind of information. Even
though in the future this is likely to change, for our techniques to be applicable it is not relevant how this communication
exactly takes place, as long as it is in terms of method calls (rather than in terms of shared state). The goal of our case study
is to ensure that no illicit interactions can happen between the various applets on the card. The code of the application is
last-call recursive, thus our veriﬁcation will be exact, and the inlining step will not introduce any new observable interface
behaviours. In this particular case study, we can verify correctness of the decomposition, thus we rely only on soundness of
the compositional veriﬁcationprinciple.However, if correctness of thedecomposition couldnot be veriﬁed, the completeness
for last-call recursive applets would tell us that our local assumption is too weak.
To understand the propertywhichwe verify here, let us look closer at how the purse and the loyalties communicate about
the purchases made with the card. The electronic purse keeps a log table of all credit and debit transactions, and the loyalty
applets can request the (relevant) information stored in this table. Further, loyalties might have so-called partner loyalties,
which means that a user can add up the points obtained with the different loyalty programs. Therefore, each loyalty should
keep track of its local balance and its extended balance. If the user wishes to know how many loyalty points are available
exactly, the loyalty applet will ask for the relevant entries of the purse log table in order to update its balance, and it will also
ask the balances of partner loyalties in order to compute the extended balance.
For efﬁciency reasons, the log table is of ﬁxed length, arranged as a ring. If the log table is full, existing entries will be
replaced by new transactions. In order to ensure that loyalties do not miss any of the logged transactions, they can subscribe
to the so-called logFull service. This service signals all subscribed loyalties that the log table will be overwritten soon, and
that therefore they should update their balances. Typically, loyalties will have to pay for this service.
Suppose we have an electronic purse, which contains besides the electronic purse itself two partner loyalties, say L1 and
L2. Further, suppose that L1 has subscribed to the logFull service, while L2 has not. If in reaction to the logFull message L1
always calls an interface method of L2 (say to ask for its balance when computing the extended balance), L2 can implicitly
deduce that the log table might be full. A malicious implementation of L2 might therefore request the information stored in
the log table before returning the value of its local balance to L1. If loyalties have to pay for the logFull service, such control
ﬂow is unwanted, since the owner of the Purse applet will not want other loyalties to get this information for free.
This is a typical example of an illicit applet interaction, that our compositional veriﬁcation technique can detect. Below,
we show how the absence of this particular undesired scenario can be speciﬁed and veriﬁed algorithmically. We use com-
positional reasoning to reduce the global behavioural property expressing the absence of the scenario described above to
local structural properties of the purse and loyalty applet classes. We assume there is only one purse applet on the card, but
we allow an arbitrary number of loyalty applets on the card. However, since all loyalty applets have the same interface, we
can apply class-based analysis, and treat all loyalty instances in a similar way. The case study provides implementations for
the purse and the loyalty applet. These are checked against the corresponding structural properties. Notice that a typical use
of the card initially only will have the purse applet installed on the card. After the card has been issued, new loyalty applets
will be installed whenever the card holder wishes to join a loyalty program. Every time a new loyalty applet is installed, it
will have to be veriﬁed against the structural speciﬁcation of the loyalty applet.
8.2. Speciﬁcation
This section presents the formalisation of the global and local security properties that we need for our example. The
following section then shows how the tool set is used for the veriﬁcation of the decomposition and of the implementations
with respect to the local properties.
8.2.1. Speciﬁcation patterns
Since writing speciﬁcations in the modal -calculus is known to be difﬁcult (even in the simulation logic fragment), we
deﬁne a collection of commonly used speciﬁcation patterns (inspired by the Bandera Speciﬁcation Pattern project [44]). In
our experience, all relevant behavioural control-ﬂow safety properties can be expressed using a small set of such patterns –
however, it is important to remember that one can always fall back on the full expressiveness of simulation logic.We present
several speciﬁcation patterns, both at structural and behavioural level, which are all used in the case study at hand. From
now on we shall adopt the convention of denoting structural properties by σ and behavioural ones by φ.
Structural speciﬁcation patterns We shall use Everywherewith the obvious formalisation:
Everywhere σ = νY . σ ∧ [ε, I−]Y
= Y [Y = σ ∧ [ε, I−]Y ]
as well as the following patterns, for method setsM andM′ of an applet with interface I:
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M HasNoCallsTo M′ = (∧m∈M ¬m) ∨ (Everywhere [M′] ff)
HasNoOutsideCalls M = M HasNoCallsTo (I− −M)
The ﬁrst pattern speciﬁes that method graphs in the setM do not contain edges labelled with elements of the setM′. The
second speciﬁes a closed set of methodsM, i.e., methods inM only contain calls to methods inM.
Behavioural speciﬁcation patterns Pattern Always is standard:
Always φ = νZ. φ ∧ [Lb]Z
= Z[Z = φ ∧ [Lb]Z]
For specifying that a property φ is to hold within a call to methodm, we use theWithin pattern formalised as follows:
Within m φ = ¬m ∨ (Always φ)
More precisely, this pattern states that φ always holds as soon as m is called. However, since we do not use this pattern
inside other formulae, the given description is correct. Notice that this is a typical behavioural pattern: the notion of Within
a method invocation encompasses all methods that might be invoked during the call to m. This reachability notion cannot
be directly expressed at the structural level.
Finally, for applet A : (I+, I−) and method setM, we deﬁne:
CanNotCallAM =
∧
m∈I+
∧
m′∈M
[mcall m′]ff
This pattern holds for state (v, σ) if no call to a method inM is possible.
8.2.2. The security properties
We express the security properties at the public level, that is, structural properties refer to the interface abstraction
(i.e., inlined version) and behavioural properties to the interface behaviour of applets. As mentioned above, communication
between applets takes place via so-called sharable interfaces. The Purse applet deﬁnes a sharable interface SIP for com-
munication with loyalty applets, containing the methods getTransaction, isThereTransaction, getInvExchangeRateIntPart and
getInvExchangeRateDecPart. The Loyalty applet deﬁnes two sharable interfaces: one, SILP , for communication with a Purse,
containing the methods logFull and exchangeRate, and one, SILL , for communication with other loyalty applets, contain-
ing methods getBalance and getDebit. If we deﬁne SIL = SILP ∪ SILL , then we can identify the following public interfaces:
IP = (SIP , SIP ∪ SIL) for Purse, and IL = (SIL , SIP ∪ SIL) for Loyalty.
The global security property To guarantee that no loyalty will get the opportunity to circumvent subscribing to the logFull
service, we require that if the Purse calls the logFull method of a loyalty, within this call the loyalty does not communicate
with other loyalties. However, as the logFullmethod is supposed to call the Purse for its transactions, we also have to exclude
indirect communications, via the Purse. We require the following global property of the interface behaviour:
A call to Loyalty.logFull does not trigger any calls to any other loyalty.
This property can be formalised with the help of behavioural patterns:
φ = Within Loyalty.logFull
(CanNotCall Loyalty SIL ∧ CanNotCall Purse SIL)
Thus, if a loyalty receives a logFull message, it cannot call any other loyalty (because it cannot call any of its sharable
interface methods), and in addition, if the Purse is (re)activated within the call to logFull, it cannot call any loyalty applet.
Property decomposition We apply rule (wac-2) from Section 6.3 and therefore introduce local structural properties for the
inlined versions of Purse and Loyalty. Here we explain the formalisation of the local properties; below we describe how
we actually verify that these are sufﬁcient to guarantee the global behavioural property. Within Loyalty.logFull, the Loyalty
applet has to call the methods Purse.isThereTransaction and Purse.getTransaction, but it should not make any other external
calls (where calls to sharable interface methods of Loyalty are considered external). Notice that since we are performing
class-based analysis, we cannot distinguish between calls to interface methods of other instances, and those of the same
instance. Thus, a natural structural property for Loyaltywould be, informally:
From any entry point of Loyalty.logFull, the only reachable external calls are calls to Purse.isThereTransaction and
Purse.getTransaction.
Thus, within a call to Loyalty.logFull the Purse applet can only be activated via Purse.isThereTransaction or Purse.getTransaction.
For Pursewe can therefore propose the following informal structural property:
From any entry point of Purse.isThereTransaction or Purse.getTransaction, no edge labelled by an external call is
reachable.
Using the structural speciﬁcation patterns, we can specify these properties as follows.
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σL = {Loyalty.logFull} HasNoCallsTo
(SIP ∪ SIL) − {Purse.isThereTransaction, Purse.getTransaction}
σP = HasNoOutsideCalls {Purse.isThereTransaction} ∧
HasNoOutsideCalls {Purse.getTransaction}
Notice that these speciﬁcations are expressed with respect to the inlined versions of the applets. Excluding external
calls from a method at the public level is equivalent to excluding external calls from any private method that can be
called transitively from the public method at the implementation level - a property which is not directly expressible (at
the implementation level) in our logic (cf. Huisman et al. [30]).
8.3. Veriﬁcation
After the global and local security properties have been speciﬁed, we have to show that: (1) the local properties are
sufﬁcient to establish the global security property, and (2) the implementations of the different applets respect the local
properties. In order to do this, we identify the following (independent) tasks, considered in detail below.
(1) Verifying the correctness of the property decomposition by:
(a) building θIP (σP) and θIL (σL), the maximal applets for σP and σL , respectively; and
(b) model checking θIP (σP) unionmulti θIL (σL) |=b δ(φ).
(2) Verifying the local structural properties by:
(a) extracting the applet graphs P of the Purse and L of the Loyalty;
(b) computing αSIP (P) and αSIL (L) using the inlining algorithm; and
(c) model checking αSIP (P) |=s σP and αSIL (L) |=s σL .
We then apply rule (wac-2) to conclude that P unionmulti L |=SIP∪SIL
b,w
φ as required.
8.3.1. Veriﬁcation of the property decomposition
To illustrate the procedure of constructing a maximal applet, we present in some detail the construction of the maximal
applet for σL; for σP the construction is similar. First, we write σL as a modal equation system, where we use lf to abbreviate
Loyalty.logFull, gT for Purse.getTransaction, iTT for Purse.isThereTransaction, andM for (SIP ∪ SIL) −
{
iTT , gT
}
:
σL = ¬lf ∨ Y [Y = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]Y ]
Next, we build the interface formula φIL for interface IL (recall that the maximal applet for σL is the maximal model for
σL ∧ φIL ). For clarity of presentation we shall make here the simplifying assumption that SIL = {lf }; the actual case study has
naturally been performed for the full sharable interface. Thus φIL = Xlf [Xlf = [ε, lf , SIP ]Xlf ∧ lf ]. We then form the conjunction
σL ∧ φIL , which by introducing a new variable Z yields:
Z
⎡
⎣ Z = (¬lf ∨ Y) ∧ XlfY = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]Y
Xlf = [ε, lf , SIP ]Xlf ∧ lf
⎤
⎦
The next step is to transform this formula into SNF. First, in Phase I of the transformation, each equation is transformed
into a disjunction of state normal forms. Suppose we start with the equation deﬁning Z .
(1) Make equation strongly guarded, by rewriting with the original equations:
Z = (¬lf∨([M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]Y)) ∧ [ε, lf , SIP ]Xlf ∧ lf
(2) Put equation into DNF and simplify:
Z = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]Y ∧ [ε, lf , SIP ]Xlf ∧ lf
(3) Group and complete boxes. No boxes are missing, thus we only group them (remember M = (SIP ∪ SIL) − {gT , iTT} =
(SIP ∪ {lf }) − {gT , iTT}):
Z = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ](Y ∧ Xlf ) ∧ lf
(4) Introduce new equations for formulae under boxes. Since the map h does not yet contain an entry for {Y ,Xlf }, we choose
a fresh variable U and add ({Y ,Xlf },U) to h. The equation deﬁning Z becomes
Z = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]U ∧ lf
while we introduce the new equation U = Y ∧ Xlf .
(5) Finally, complete the equation by addingmissing literals and put the formula intoDNF again. Here, only literal r ismissing.
Adding this gives:
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Fig. 7. Maximal applets for σL and σP .
Z = ([M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]U ∧ lf ∧ r)∨
([M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]U ∧ lf ∧ ¬r)
The equations deﬁning Y and Xlf are handled in a similar way. The only step that has some effect is step 5, which introduces
the missing literal r. More interesting is how Phase I is applied to the new equation U = Y ∧ Xlf .
(1) Rewriting into strongly guarded form yields:
U = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]Y ∧ [ε, lf , SIP ]Xlf ∧ lf
(2) Formula φU is already in DNF and cannot be simpliﬁed.
(3) Grouping boxes results in the following equation:
U = [M]ff ∧ [ε, lf , SIP ](Y ∧ Xlf ) ∧ lf
(4) The map h contains the pair ({Y ,Xlf },U), so we replace Y ∧ Xlf by U.
U = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]U ∧ lf
(5) Literal completion again introduces r.
U = ([M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]U ∧ lf ∧ r)∨
([M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ]U ∧ lf ∧ ¬r)
After applying Phase I to all equations, Phase II introduces a new equation for each disjunct and replaces each old variable
by the disjunction of the new variables. For example, the equation deﬁning U gets replaced by:
U1 = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ](U1 ∨ U2) ∧ lf ∧ r
U2 = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ](U1 ∨ U2) ∧ lf ∧ ¬r
The remaining equations are treated similarly. Notice that also Z in X gets replaced by {Z1, Z2}, where Z1 and Z2 are the
equations replacing Z .
During the optimisation in Phase III, we ﬁnd that the equations for Z1 and U1, and Z2 and U2 are duplicates of each other.
Therefore, we remove the equations for Z1 and Z2, and replace {Z1, Z2} in X by {U1,U2}. Further, the equations Y1, Y2, Xlf1 and
Xlf2 (replacing Y andXlf in Phase II), are not reachable fromany variable inX = {U1,U2}. Hence, the ﬁnal result is (U1 ∨ U2)[	],
where
	 =
[
U1 = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ](U1 ∨ U2) ∧ lf ∧ r
U2 = [M]ff ∧ [ε, gT , iTT ](U1 ∨ U2) ∧ lf ∧ ¬r
]
The speciﬁcation extracted from this modal equation system (which is in simulation normal form) is the maximal applet
θIL (σL) for σL . It is shown in Figure 7(a). The method graph has two nodes; both of them are entry points of the method,
but only one is labelled as a return point. The edges are labelled only with internal actions and calls to getTransaction and
isThereTransaction. As mentioned above, in the computation above we simpliﬁed SIL to {lf }. If we do the computation for the
complete shareable interface SIL , we ﬁnd that for all other methods m in SIL , the method graph is a maximal method graph
without restrictions, as in Figure 7(b). If we do the same computation for σP , we ﬁnd themethod graph for isThereTransaction
in the maximal model for the Purse as in Figure 7(c), i.e., the method can only call itself or make internal transitions. The
method graph for getTransaction is similar, with all edges labelled with getTransaction or ε, while the method graphs for the
other methods provided by the Purse are maximal method graphs, without any restrictions.
Using our implementation of the maximal model construction in Ocaml, computing the maximal applets for σL and σP
takes less than a second. Table 2 shows the relevant information.
Once the maximal applets θIP (σP) and θIL (σL) are constructed, we produce their composition θIP (σP) unionmulti θIL (σL), and we use
the Model Generator to translate the applet graph to a PDA representation, serving as input to a PDA model checker.
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Table 2
Size and timing for maximal applet construction
θIL (σL) θIP (σP )
# Nodes 8 8
# Edges 120 88
Constr. time (s) 0.05 0.05
Table 3
Statistics on applet graph extraction and veriﬁcation
# Classes # Methods # Nodes # Edges Extr. time (s) Inline time (s) Mod. gen. time (s) Verif. time (s)
Loyalty 11 237 3 782 4 372 5.6 0.6 2.8 10.1
Purse 15 367 5 882 7 205 7.5 0.6 0.6 3.6
8.3.2. Correctness of the local structural properties
We use the Applet Analyser to extract applet graphs and the appropriate set of entry points from the byte code of the
loyalty and purse implementations. Table 3 provides statistics on the extracted applet graphs.
Next, we applied the implementation of the inlining algorithm to the extracted applet graphs, which took 0.6 seconds on
both Loyalty and Purse. Since the applets are last-call recursive, the inlining does not introduce any new observable interface
behaviours. Even though theoretically the worst-case blowup in the number of nodes of the inlined applets, determined by
the number of normal M-frames, is exponential in the number of private methods, in practice this is not likely to happen.
In our case, we even observed a reduction in size of the graphs due to the following two facts: ﬁrst, the call dependency
graph is sparse and, second, the inlining focuses on interaction between applets, and thus any code that is not reachable by
a shareable interface method is abstracted away by the inlining (as it is not relevant to the property we are interested in).
Finally, we used the Model Generator to translate the inlined applet graphs into input for CWB, and we veriﬁed the
structural properties. Table 3 also provides statistics for the model generation and veriﬁcation time.
Remark. Initially, we did not distinguish between public and private methods when we performed the case study (see [30]).
This gave signiﬁcant performance problems: the maximal applets contained implementations for (and calls to) all private
methods as well, which resulted in huge structures. Moreover, without the distinction between public and private methods
we had to compute the transitive closure of method calls to be able to express the local structural speciﬁcations, which
resulted in a non-robust speciﬁcation: for example splitting a private method into two would break the local speciﬁcation.
Adding thedistinction betweenpublic andprivatemethods thus resulted in a conceptually cleaner compositional veriﬁcation
method, with a drastically improved performance.
9. Conclusion
We have developed a compositional veriﬁcation method for sequential programs with procedures. The method is partic-
ularly suited for supporting the secure dynamic loading of applets onto smart cards and other smart devices, but dynamically
reconﬁguring distributed systems based on remote procedure call communication also provides a suitable application area
for the method. Using our veriﬁcation method, secure dynamic loading can be achieved through the following scenario:
(1) Specify global security property φ (at structural or behavioural public level).
(2) For any initially unavailable applet A with public interface I containing public methods M, specify a local speciﬁcation
σA (at structural public level).
(3) Compute amaximal applet θI(σA), and verify that thismaximal applet, composedwith the inlining of the already available
applets B (with public methods N) satisﬁes φ, i.e., verify θI(σA) unionmulti αN(B) |= φ. This establishes the correctness of the
decomposition.
(4) When applet A becomes available, compute its abstraction αM(A) by inlining its private methods, and verify that this
abstraction respects the local speciﬁcation, i.e., αM(A) |= σA.
Notice that we restrict attention to control-ﬂow safety properties. We have shown applicability of this approach on an
industrial case study. To support the above scenario, we have developed the following theoretical contributions:
(1) a logical characterisation of simulation, and vice versa, a behavioural characterisation of logical satisfaction (for safety
properties) in terms of maximal models;
(2) adaptation of the maximal model technique to procedural programs;
(3) a sound and complete compositional veriﬁcation method for procedural programs; and
(4) a behaviour-preserving inlining transformation of procedural programs.
Future work The program model which forms the basis for our analyses is rather abstract. We are currently investigating
how to extend our techniques to ﬁner program models. In particular, we are considering program models capturing multi-
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threading and exceptions. Our compositional veriﬁcation principle remains valid, as long as the notions of structure and
behaviour (and the corresponding notions of simulation and logic) can be extended so that the necessary technical conditions
still apply. However, the veriﬁcation problem for the global behavioural property becomes undecidable in the presence of
multi-threading [45] (when considering the same primitives as in e.g., Java), thus appropriate abstraction techniques have
to be employed for this task (as proposed in e.g., [46,47,48]). A further extension of signiﬁcant interest is adding data to the
programmodel, so that a more precise control ﬂow can bemodelled, and properties over data can be speciﬁed. This requires
again the use of appropriate abstractions in order to retain decidability of the veriﬁcation problems.
In principle, our veriﬁcation technique canbe extended tomore expressive logics, for example to the fullmodal-calculus.
However, adding diamond modalities and least ﬁxed-point recursion to the logic requires a more general notion of model
(and hence applet structures and behaviours) in the framework; for example, see [26,49] for suchmodels and corresponding
maximal model constructions.
Further, we are investigating under what restrictions one can construct maximal applets for behavioural properties,
thus extending the method to deal with local behavioural properties. The approach we take is to deﬁne a translation from
behavioural properties into collections of structural properties, such that any applet that is simulated by a maximal applet
for one of the structural properties satisﬁes the original behavioural one. Preliminary results in this direction are presented
in [11].
References
[1] Common Criteria. Available from: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
[2] G. Chugunov, L. Fredlund, D. Gurov, Model checking of multi-applet JavaCard applications, Smart Card Research and Advanced Application Conference
(CARDIS ’02), USENIX Publications, 2002, pp. 87–95.
[3] J. Esparza, D. Hansel, P. Rossmanith, S. Schwoon, Efﬁcient algorithms for model checking pushdown systems, Computer Aided Veriﬁcation (CAV ’00),
LNCS, vol. 1855, Springer Verlag, 2000, pp. 232–247.
[4] F. Besson, T. Jensen, D. Le Métayer, T. Thorn, Model checking security properties of control ﬂow graphs, Journal of Computer Security 9 (3) (2001)
217–250.
[5] R. Alur, M. Benedikt, K. Etessami, P. Godefroid, T. Reps, M. Yannakakis, Analysis of recursive state machines, ACM TOPLAS 27 (2005) 786–818.
[6] O. Grumberg, D. Long, Model checking and modular veriﬁcation, ACM TOPLAS 16 (3) (1994) 843–871.
[7] G. Barthe, D. Gurov, M. Huisman, Compositional veriﬁcation of secure applet interactions, Fundamental Approaches to Software Engineering (FASE
’02), LNCS, vol. 2306, Springer Verlag, 2002, pp. 15–32.
[8] D. Kozen, Results on the propositional -calculus, Theoretical Computer Science 27 (1983) 333–354.
[9] A. Bouajjani, J. Fernandez, S. Graf, C. Rodriguez, J. Sifakis, Safety for branching time semantics, Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP ’91),
LNCS, vol. 501, Springer Verlag, 1991, pp. 76–92.
[10] O. Burkart, D. Caucal, F. Moller, B. Steffen, Veriﬁcation on inﬁnite structures, in: J. Bergstra, A. Ponse, S. Smolka (Eds.), Handbook of Process Algebra,
North Holland, 2000, pp. 545–623.
[11] D. Gurov, M. Huisman, Reducing behavioural to structural properties of programs with procedures, Tech. Rep. TRITA-CSC-TCS 2007:3, KTH Royal
Institute of Technology, Stockholm. 2007. Available from: http://www.csc.kth.se/∼dilian/Papers/techrep-07-3.pdf.
[12] R. Vallée-Rai, L. Hendren, V. Sundaresan, P. Lam, E. Gagnon, P. Co, Soot—a Java Optimization Framework, in: CASCON ’99, 1999, pp. 125–135. Available
from: http://www.sable.mcgill.ca/soot/.
[13] A. Lal, T.W. Reps, Improving pushdown system model checking, Computer Aided Veriﬁcation (CAV ’06), LNCS, vol. 4144, Springer Verlag, 2006, pp.
343–357.
[14] R. Alur, K. Etessami, P. Madhusudan, A temporal logic for nested calls and returns, Tools and Algorithms for the Analysis and Construction of Software
(TACAS ’04), LNCS, vol. 2998, Springer Verlag, 2004, pp. 467–481.
[15] R. Alur, M. Arenas, P. Barcelo, K. Etessami, N. Immerman, L. Libkin, First-order and temporal logics for nested words, Logic in Computer Science (LICS
’07), IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2007, pp. 151–160.
[16] W.-P. de Roever, F. de Boer, U. Hannemann, J. Hooman, Y. Lakhnech, M. Poel, J. Zwiers, Concurrency Veriﬁcation: Introduction to Compositional and
Noncompositional Methods, No. 54 in Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[17] K. Laster, O. Grumberg,Modularmodel checking of software, Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Tools and Algorithms for Construction
and Analysis of Systems (TACAS ’98), LNCS, vol. 1384, Springer Verlag, 1998, pp. 20–35.
[18] R. Alur, R. Grosu, Modular reﬁnement of hierarchic reactive machines, ACM TOPLAS 26 (2004) 339–360.
[19] O. Ly, Compositional veriﬁcation: Decidability issues using graph substitutions, Proceedings of the 29th Mathematical Foundations of Computer
Science (MFCS ’04), LNCS, vol. 3153, Springer Verlag, 2004, pp. 537–549.
[20] H. Andersen, Partial model checking (extended abstract), Logic in Computer Science (LICS ’95), IEEE Computer Society Press, 1995, pp. 398–407.
[21] O. Kupferman, M. Vardi, An automata-theoretic approach to modular model checking, ACM TOPLAS 22 (1) (2000) 87–128.
[22] G. Boudol, K. Larsen, Graphical versus logical speciﬁcations, Theoretical Computer Science 106 (1992) 3–20.
[23] K. Larsen, Modal speciﬁcations, Automatic Veriﬁcation Methods for Finite State Systems, LNCS, vol. 407, Springer Verlag, 1989, pp. 232–246.
[24] M. Hennessy, R. Milner, Algebraic laws for nondeterminism and concurrency, Journal of the ACM 32 (1985) 137–161.
[25] D.Dams, K.Namjoshi, The existence of ﬁnite abstractions for branching timemodel checking,NineteenthAnnual IEEE SymposiumonLogic in Computer
Science (LICS ’04), IEEE Computer Society Press, 2004, pp. 335–344.
[26] D. Dams, K. Namjoshi, Automata as abstractions, Veriﬁcation, Model Checking, and Abstract Interpretation (VMCAI ’05), LNCS, vol. 3385, Springer
Verlag, 2005, pp. 216–232.
[27] M. Goldman, S. Katz, MAVEN: Modular aspect veriﬁcation, Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS ’07), LNCS, vol.
4424, Springer Verlag, 2007, pp. 308–322.
[28] C. Sprenger, D. Gurov, M. Huisman, Compositional veriﬁcation for secure loading of smart card applets, Formal Methods and Models for Co-Design
(MEMOCODE ’04), IEEE Computer Society, 2004, pp. 211–222.
[29] D. Gurov, M. Huisman, Interface abstraction for compositional veriﬁcation, Software Engineering and Formal Methods (SEFM’05), IEEE Computer
Society, 2005, pp. 414–423.
[30] M. Huisman, D. Gurov, C. Sprenger, G. Chugunov, Checking absence of illicit applet interactions: a case study, Fundamental Approaches to Software
Engineering (FASE ’04), LNCS, vol. 2984, Springer Verlag, 2004, pp. 84–98.
[31] H. Bekicˇ, Deﬁnable operators in general algebras, and the theory of automata and ﬂowcharts, Tech. Rep., IBM Laboratory, 1967.
[32] C. Stirling, Modal and Temporal Logics of Processes, Springer Verlag, 2001.
[33] A. Tarski, A lattice-theoretical ﬁxpoint theorem and its applications, Paciﬁc Journal of Mathematics 5 (1955) 285–310.
[34] A. Arnold, D. Niwin´ski, Rudiments of μ-calculus, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, vol. 146, Elsevier Publishing, 2001.
868 D. Gurov et al. / Information and Computation 206 (2008) 840–868
[35] I. Walukiewicz, Pushdown processes: games and model checking, in: Computer Aided Veriﬁcation (CAV ’96), LNCS, vol. 1102, 1996, pp. 62–75.
[36] C. Sprenger, D. Gurov, M. Huisman, Simulation logic, applets and compositional veriﬁcation, Tech. Rep. RR-4890, INRIA, 2003.
[37] D. Gurov, M. Huisman, Abstraction over public interfaces, Tech. Rep. RR-5330, INRIA, 2004.
[38] R. Cleaveland, J. Parrow, B. Steffen, A semantics based veriﬁcation tool for ﬁnite state systems, International Symposium on Protocol Speciﬁcation,
Testing and Veriﬁcation, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1990, pp. 287–302.
[39] D. Polanský, Verifying properties of inﬁnite-state systems, Master’s thesis, Masaryk University, Faculty of Informatics, Brno, 2000.
[40] A. Bouajjani, J. Esparza, O. Maler, Reachability analysis of pushdown automata: Application to model-checking, in: International Conference on
Concurrency Theory (CONCUR ’97), vol. 1243 of LNCS, 1997, pp. 135–150.
[41] E. Bretagne, A.E. Marouani, P. Girard, J.-L. Lanet, PACAP purse and loyalty speciﬁcation, Tech. Rep. V 0.4, Gemplus, 2000.
[42] C. Breunesse, N. Catan˜o, M. Huisman, B. Jacobs, Formal methods for smart cards: an experience report, Science of Computer Programming 55 (1–3)
(2005) 53–80.
[43] P. Bieber, J. Cazin, P. Girard, J.-L. Lanet, V. Wiels, G. Zanon, Checking secure interactions of smart card applets, Journal of Computer Security 10 (4)
(2002) 369–398.
[44] J. Corbett, M. Dwyer, J. Hatcliff, Robby, A language framework for expressing checkable properties of dynamic software, International SPINWorkshop
on SPIN Model Checking and Software Veriﬁcation, LNCS, vol. 1885, Springer Verlag, 2000, pp. 205–223.
[45] G. Ramalingam, Context-sensitive synchronization-sensitive analysis is undecidable, ACM TOPLAS 22 (2) (2000) 416–430.
[46] A. Bouajjani, J. Esparza, T. Touili, A generic approach to the static analysis of concurrent programs with procedures, SIGPLAN Notes 38 (1) (2003)
62–73.
[47] A. Bouajjani, J. Esparza, S. Schwoon, J. Strejcˇek, Reachability analysis of multithreaded software with asynchronous communication, Foundations of
Software Technology and Theoretical Computer Science (FSTTCS ’05), LNCS, vol. 3821, Springer Verlag, 2005, pp. 348–359.
[48] S. Qadeer, J. Rehof, Context-boundedmodel checking of concurrent software, Tools andAlgorithms for the Construction andAnalysis of Systems (TACAS
’05), LNCS, vol. 3440, Springer Verlag, 2005, pp. 93–107.
[49] I. Aktug, D. Gurov, State space representation for veriﬁcation of open systems, Algebraic Methodology And Software Technology (AMAST ’06), LNCS,
vol. 4019, Springer Verlag, 2006, pp. 5–20.
